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PERSPECTIVES ON POLICY: THE EFFECTS OF U.S. GREATER MIDDLE EAST
INITIATIVE ON EGYPTIAN POLITICAL ATTITUDES

Maureen M. Mansour

ABSTRACT

This study examines the political attitudes of seven educated Egyptians from
Alexandria, Egypt. It seeks to understand their interpretations of the U.S. democratization
policy in the Middle East, the Greater Middle East Initiative. The goal is to understand if
these Egyptians are receptive to the suggestion of democratic reforms and Egypt. Personal
interviews with open-ended questions allowed for individual insights and rich depth of
information.
Interviews were conducted in Alexandria, Egypt as a traditionally liberal city with a
long history of exposure to Western ideas. The respondents are a part of a small elite subgroup of Egyptian society.

As typically more liberal and open to Western ideas, educated

members of Egyptian society have a distinct political culture and have been examined
separately from the mass population.
Aside from one anti-Islamic respondent, the respondents express an overall negative
view of the U.S. government, of which three cite positive feelings toward American people.
Six of the seven respondents had very similar political attitudes including a belief that that
the U.S. invaded Iraq as a quest for oil and to control of the Middle East, not for genuine
democratic reforms. Every participant expressed considerable pessimism about the
prospects for democratization in the region. The majority do not welcome America’s call for
ii

reform in Egypt because of mistrust of the U.S. or the belief that American values are illsuited for Egyptian society. The results show that the personal narratives of these seven
Egyptian individuals are very similar to the perspectives found in public opinion surveys
previously conducted among the masses in Egypt.
Qualitative interviewing showed their strong belief that there is an all-powerful
U.S.-Jewish conspiracy that enacts policies to target the Arab world. This neo-colonial
worldview interprets and perceives all negative political events as an example of the
repeated injustices against Arabs and Muslims by Western powers.

iii

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Research Questions and Hypotheses
In response to global terrorism, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East has shifted by
emphasizing the concept of democratization and liberal political reform. This policy, The Greater
Middle East Initiative, is defined as a formal foreign policy doctrine for freedom in the Middle
East. The September 11th terrorist attacks on the U.S. acted as the catalyst for the change in
policy as U.S. policymakers may the claim that democratization is a central part of the U.S.
counterterrorism policy. The Bush Administration has shifted U.S. policy of accepting the status
quo of authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes to one that encourages democratic reforms.
The Greater Middle East Initiative aims to restructure the political, economic and
strategic profile of the region from Pakistan to Morocco.1 On May 9, 2003, U.S. President
George W. Bush formally proclaimed that it was time for the United States to support democracy
in the Middle East:2
We support the advance of freedom in the Middle East, because it is our founding
principle, and because it is our national interest. The hateful ideology of terrorism is
shaped and nurtured and protected by oppressive regimes. Free nations, in contrast,
encourage creativity and tolerance and enterprise. And in those free nations, the appeal of

1

“EU/Middle East: Solana’s Talks in Egypt Focus on Reform Initiative,” European Report (Europe
Information Service, 6 March 2004): 506 [journal online]
http://web6.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/383/661/48082959w6/purl=rc1_EAIM_0 (accessed 6
April 2004).
2
Glenn Frankel, “Egypt Muzzles Calls for Democracy,” Washington Post Foreign Service, 1 June 2004.
http://coranet.radicalparty.org/pressreview/print_right.php?func=detail&par=7686 (accessed March 29,
2004): p. 1 of 8.
1

extremism withers away.3
The ultimate goal of this policy is to protect America’s national security interests claiming that by
promoting political participation, it will serve as a complement to the war on terrorism. By
alleviating the political repression in the Middle East, the argument continues, Arab citizens will
have an outlet for grievances, which will ultimately prevent the radicalization of Muslims.
These alleged goals for democracy promotion are also clearly stated in the Bush administration’s
2002 National Security Strategy of the United States and described as a core part of the overall
U.S. national security doctrine:
America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of
law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal
justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private
property.4
Bush claims that during the past sixty years Western nations have excused the lack of freedom in
the Middle East and has not made them safe because stability cannot be substituted for the
expense of liberty.5 The objective is to combat the threat of terrorism by alleviating repressive
conditions that contribute to the radicalization of Muslims. By promoting democracy in the
closed societies of the Middle East, the Bush administration seeks to promote a set of values that
will be a powerful alternative to the appeal of religious extremism. This will ultimately prevent
its channel of expression, violent terrorist activity.
The U.S.-led war in Iraq in 2003 has been promoted by the Bush administration as a part
of the U.S. effort to create a democratic world order. U.S. leaders expected the mainstream Arab
public to be impressed by the gratitude of the Iraqi people for their newfound freedom. Anti-

3

Speech by President George W. Bush on 9 May 2003 at the University of South Carolina, (White House
Government News Release), available from http//www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/2003050911.html.
4
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002) : 3.
5
“Bush Says Democracy in MidEast Will be a Focus of U.S. Policy” (based on a speech by George W.
Bush on 6 November 2003 at Whitehall Palace, London, England), in Official Texts of Greater Middle East
Initiative (Cairo: Information Resource Center of American Embassy, 7 March 2004).
2

Americanism would then be discredited and new ways of thinking would emerge.6 The
democratic transformation of Iraq was to be the model for the rest of the Middle East.
Public opinion in the Middle East about Iraq has generally scoffed at the Bush
administration’s rhetoric of democracy promotion. Language used by Arabs to describe the
American presence in Iraq was not filled with gratitude; rather it paralleled descriptions of the
hated Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza where American troops are called
“invaders”, not liberators.7 The ambivalent U.S. attitudes toward Iraqi democracy have further
reinforced deep preexisting skepticism about American intentions in the region. The aggressive
U.S. policy of democratization through force has actually threatened the integrity of American
political ideals. It has further alienated the Arab world from the U.S. and the democratic ideals it
seeks to promote.
Bush administration, however, misjudged the reaction of regarding the war in Iraq, and as
a result, is having a difficult time being viewed as a champion of democracy. The overwhelming
majority of Arabs in the Middle East claim that America’s decision to topple Saddam Hussein’s
regime was driven by the desire to consolidate its regional and global hegemony, not for genuine
democratic reform. Additional survey research confirms these perceptions.
The American goal of spreading of democracy, often referred to as international
liberalism, has been a component of liberal U.S. foreign policy throughout many previous U.S.
administrations. Promoting democratic values has been considered an integral part of the national
interest of the country. The theory is that of the U.S. supports freedom, individual rights, the rule
of law, and democratic institutions around the world it will help secure peace and stability among
states, and advance human rights within states. The spread of liberal values to other countries is
thought to secure the American way of life.

6
7

Marc Lynch, “Taking Arabs Seriously,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 5 (2003) : 88, 81-94.
Ibid., 89.
3

This democratization policy rests on a set of assumptions about democratic nations.
The rationale is that democratic institutions and processes will allow for a peaceful reconciliation
of grievances and provide channels for participation in policymaking, thereby, addressing the
underlining issues that fuel the rise of Islamist extremism.8 The claim is that a democratic
government is subject to the will of the people and therefore less prone to war and less likely to
breed or harbor terrorists.9 Similarly, tyrannical governments are expected to disregard
international agreements and coerce their neighbors because they mistreat their own citizens.10
The domestic affairs of a nation are assumed to be directly related to its foreign policy. The U.S.
democratization policy is based on the assumption that more democracies in the world will
provide greater stability, less terrorism, and peaceful relations with other countries.11
The American definition of democracy includes various characteristics. Democratization
is seen as a process that promotes democratic practices including the right of adult citizens to
choose their leader through free and fair elections. Citizens should have the opportunity to
participate in making decisions that affect their lives and have the right to criticize their
government for its actions. Leaders should be accountable and responsive to the needs of their
citizens because of the transparency of political decision-making. A national economy that
fosters competitions and free enterprise is also considered vital for a viable democracy. The
Greater Middle East Initiative sets three reform priorities to achieve these goals: promoting
democracy and good governance, building a knowledge society, and expanding economic
opportunities.12

8

Jennifer L. Windsor, “Promoting Democratization Can Combat Terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly
26.3 (2003) : 43, 43-58.
9
Suzanne Nossel, “Smart Power,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (2004) : 135, 131-142.
10
Robert Jervis, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine,” American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays 5d ed.,
ed. John G. Ikenberry (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005) : 577, 576-599.
11
Ibid.
12
Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, “The Greater Middle East Initiative: Off to a False Start,” Policy
Brief 29 (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2004).
4

The U.S. is particularly interested in Egypt as one of its most important allies in the
Middle East. Egypt has considerable moral influence on other Arab states as well as a central
geographic location that contributes greatly to its strategic importance.13 Throughout history
cumulative research on this “political trendsetter” has introduced methods and concepts in study
of Arab political systems more generally and has provided a barometer of “changing trends and
generational shifts in approaches to understanding Middle Eastern politics.”14 Egypt’s future
political course has and will continue to have an immense affect on the rest of the Middle East.
In relation to U.S. interests, few other countries in the Middle East are considered as vital
as Egypt. It is considered the “gate to the Arab world and the anchor of American Middle East
policy,”15 because of its proximity to the oil-producing Gulf region and active involvement in the
Arab Israeli peace process. The U.S. made Egypt an important ally in the region when it became
the first Arab country to make peace with Israel. As Egypt continues to be a pivotal actor in
diplomatic efforts in the region, it remains the second biggest recipient of U.S. military and
economic aid16 receiving over two billion dollars each year.17
The importance of Egypt to U.S. policy is emphasized once again in relation to the new
effort to promote democracy in the Middle East. U.S. President George W. Bush encourages
democratic reform in Egypt by saying, “The great and proud nation of Egypt has shown the way
toward peace in the Middle East, and now should show the way toward democracy in the Middle

13

Joseph P. Lorenz, Egypt and the Arabs: Foreign Policy and the Search for National Identity (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1990), xiii.
14
Pamela Day Pelletreau and Robert Springborg, “Egypt,” Handbook of Political Science Research on the
Middle East and North Africa, ed. Bernard Reich (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), 23-43.
15
Fawaz A. Gerges, America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 171.
16
Frankel, “Egypt Muzzles Calls, 2.
17
Gerges, 171.
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East.”18 The hope is that the Egyptian regime, led by President Hosni Mubarak, will start
implementing meaningful political reforms and causing other Arab regimes to follow its lead.
A transition to a viable democracy in Egypt will be significantly affected by a very
important aspect of the political process, the political culture of society. Political culture refers to
the beliefs, values, and feelings that influence political behavior19 and give meaning to the
political process. It is an essential variable that will help determine the functioning of a political
system of a nation-state. Without citizens’ support for a democratic political process, it will be
very difficult for Egypt to make a successful transition to a stable democracy.
The Egyptian citizens themselves must see the need for reforms and support the
necessary changes to do so. Therefore, it is vital for to emphasize the importance of Egyptian
political culture and make every effort to understand its political history and perceptions before a
democratization policy can be implemented. It is vital to understand political attitudes of
Egyptians regarding democratization in order to assess the prospects of a viable democracy and
how best to promote it. Increasingly, survey research has provided insight regarding political
attitudes among the mass population in Egypt and the rest of the Middle East as well. Public
opinion surveys are useful in aggregating perceptions of the masses in society and providing an
overall view of public opinion.
The concept of political culture rests on the idea that each individual incorporates their
own historical context and personality, knowledge, and feelings about politics.20 It is a subjective
notion that gives meaning to the polity and is made up of both a “collective history of a political
system and the life histories of the individuals who currently make up the system.”21 Therefore, it

18

George W. Bush speech, 6 November 2003 in Washington D.C.
Gabriel A. Almond ed., “The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept,” in The Civic Culture
Revisited, ed. Sidney Verba (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), 29.
20
Lucian W. Pye, ed., “Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development,” in Political Culture and
Political Development, ed. Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 7.
21
Ibid., 8.
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is rooted in both public events and private experiences equally. This study examines these private
experiences in order to complement the earlier findings of political culture in Egypt found in
survey research.
There is specific sub-group of society that should be given special emphasis for the study
of political culture and democratization. The educated members of society have a special role to
play in the mobilization of the masses and the push toward reform. Typically those who have
been in a university setting have been exposed to a wide array of ideas and engaged in critical
thinking. This experience with education often makes an individual more receptive to new ways
of thinking and approaches to life. They are more likely to be open to Western ideas of rational
thought, equality, and liberty, which are fundamental for the emergence of a democratic system.
In Egyptian society, those who obtain a university degree are considered among the elite
in terms of social status. In 1998-99, only 1.28 million full-time and 250,000 part-time students
were enrolled out of a population of approximately 52.5 million. This means that only a small
percentage (roughly 2.5 percent) of Egyptians are students that graduate with opportunities to
become doctors, lawyers, journalists and entrepreneurs. According to 2005 statistics, only 59.3
percent of the adult population in Egypt is literate (69.4 percent of males and 48.9 percent of
females).22 There is a growing disparity between the citizens with access to higher education and
those who are more concerned with survival.
While a university education allows individuals more opportunities than those without,
widespread nepotism and corruption in government practices often restricts opportunities
available to them. In a free and fair democratic society, the educated stand to gain the most in a
‘survival of the fittest’ system that rewards those who have the knowledge and capabilities to
progress. They would greatly benefit from having their voices heard by a more democratic

22

“Egypt,” Encarta Online Encyclopedia, [database on-line]; available from
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761557408_2/Egypt.html#endads.
7

government. They may even take the opportunity to become active in the government and may
even consider running for office in an election. It is logical to assume then that it is more likely
that educated Egyptians would have a positive view towards the idea of democratization than
others in society. They would benefit from a political system that promotes free market
capitalism and participation in the political process. Are these educated elites looking forward to
America’s push for democracy in Egypt? Do they see it as an opportunity to move forward and
finally have a say in the political process? The present study will answer these questions by
taking a comprehensive look at the political attitudes of these educated individuals.
The individuals selected for the study are from a city that has historically been more
exposed to Western thought than any other in Egypt. Since its establishment by Alexander the
Great, the city of Alexandria has a rich history full of foreign influence. As the main port of the
country, Alexandria is located on the Mediterranean Sea amidst the only trade route to Asia and
Africa for hundreds of years. Fareed Zakaria calls Alexandria, “a cosmopolitan city that was
more Mediterranean than Arab.”23 It has long been the intellectual center of Egypt known for its
scholars and famous libraries full of scholarly works. Citizens of Alexandria often spoke four of
five languages including French, English, German, and Spanish. With a long history of Western
thought, these citizens are more likely to be open to Western ideas than others throughout Egypt.
To fully grasp the political attitudes of educated individuals in Alexandria, an interview
approach is most valuable. It provides each respondent with the freedom to respond to openended questions in order to better understand the interpretative style of each subject. The purpose
is to understand a person’s mind that cannot be directly observed or quantified. Open-ended
interviews allow those being interviewed to express their perspective without influencing them

23

Fareed Zakaria, “Islam, Democracy, and Constitutional Liberalism,” Political Science Quarterly 119, no.
1, (Academy of Political Science, 2004): 5, 1-20.
8

with preconceived categories. Entering into another person’s perspective is the goal of an
interview. The assumption is that their perspective is meaningful and able to be made explicit.24
The study provides a systematic analysis of the perceptions of seven Egyptian
respondents who have been educated and reside in Alexandria. The relatively small number of
respondents allows for an in-depth analysis of the personal narrative of each individual. This
approach is valuable for understanding the personal narratives of each individual. Marc Howard
Ross provides three concrete reasons for the importance of personal narratives. The first is that
their metaphors and images allow social scientists to understand how these individuals
“understand the social and political worlds in which they live.”25 Personal narratives also reveal
“deep fears, perceived threats, and past grievances that drive a conflict.”26 Lastly, these
narratives are vital in identifying particular actions and responses given for the explanations of
certain events.27
The qualitative interview approach is crucial for the study of perception and cultural
interpretations that affect political attitudes. It allows for a comprehensive insight that is essential
to providing a complete picture of the social science phenomena that is being studied. While
quantitative research conducted through mass surveys and opinion polls often provides valuable
information about the general population, it neglects to explore the rich, detailed experience of an
individual’s perception. Indeed, the factual information collected from polls can be quantified
neatly into neat numbers and provide precise conclusions. However, the concept of personal
perception is not necessarily precise or neatly quantifiable. Quantifying perceptions may be
precise in its methodology, while in terms of applicability, conclusively inaccurate.

24

Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Evaluation Methods, (Beverly Hills, CA: 1980), 196.
Marc Howard Ross, “The Political Psychology of Competing Narratives: September 11 and Beyond,” in
Understanding September 11, eds. Craig Calhoun, Paul Price, and Ashley Timmer (NY: New Press, 2002),
303.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
9
25

The important questions explored throughout each interview involves each respondent’s
definition of democracy, involvement with political parties, view about motivations of U.S.
democratization in Iraq, attitude towards the U.S. and whether and to what extent they welcome
American democratic ideals in their country. How does each respondent make sense, interpret, or
make meaning of U.S. democratization policy in the Middle East? How does each respondent
describe his or her feelings, opinions, or cultural beliefs? The goal is to understand how the
respondents view the subject, to learn about their terminology and judgments, and to capture the
complexities of their individual perceptions and experiences.28 The meanings given to specific
concepts and events including issues concerning democracy, political parties, and U.S.-led
invasion of Iraq will be studied.
Based on the political history of Egyptians and various scholarly works, the hypothesis is
that the perceptions of the educated respondents will be similar to those found in public opinion
surveys. They mostly have similar negative opinions toward U.S. democratization policy in the
Middle East. The basic assumptions of the hypothesis include: respondents will most likely have
a deep mistrust of the U.S. because of its foreign policies, rather than for American values; the
respondents will mostly likely name alternative explanations for U.S. intentions in Iraq such as a
quest for Middle East oil, global hegemony, or to engage in a war on Islam (much like during the
time of the Crusades); the respondents will not believe that democracy promotion as truly the
reason for the U.S. removal of Saddam Hussein, and will be highly mistrustful of the entire
concept of democratization in the Middle East. The respondents will show deep mistrust of U.S.
policies in the region, similar to those previously cited in public opinion surveys in the Middle
East. They will mistrust U.S. intentions in Iraq and the implementation of The Greater Middle
East Initiative interpreting it as a means to increase American control of the region.

28

Patton, 197.
10

Many discussions about democracy in the Middle East are based on anecdotal
experiences and theological beliefs. There is actually very little field research that has been done
in the region concerning public opinion and democratic reforms. Some claim to understand Arab
and Muslim peoples without first-hand knowledge of the region and its culture. This study will
go beyond anecdotal evidence and explore the personal narratives of citizens who live in the
region and are a part of the political culture.

Methodology
Field research of a political nature is rarely conducted in Egypt because of tight
government restrictions. The Egyptian government sees the discussion of democratization as a
politically sensitive issue that increases the chances that participants will more openly express
any dissatisfaction they may have with the regime. Since the researcher has Egyptian citizenship
and does not need a visa to enter the country or stay for extended periods of time, governmental
approval is not required for the research. In addition, all interviews were conducted in Egyptian
Colloquial Arabic as the spoken language and dialect of the country. The fact that the interviewer
speaks the language with the appropriate dialect helped build rapport with each respondent and
increases the likelihood that the respondents were in fact honest.
The repressive political environment in Egypt means that the interviewer has an ethical
obligation to ensure that the participants would not be harmed as a result of the study. It is the
researcher’s responsibility to ensure that each respondent will not be harmed emotionally,
physically, or financially.29 To protect the participants from governmental measures including
possible arrest and detainment, the name of each participant is disguised and their identity hidden.
Each respondent was verbally assured by the interviewer that their identity would not be

29

Herbert J. Rubin and Irene S. Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data (London: Sage
Publications, 1995), 94.
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uncovered in any written and verbal accounts of the research. The promise of confidentiality was
an effort to alleviate any possible fears of imprisonment by the Egyptian government allowing
more honest answers. This is especially true if a respondent in the event that a respondent was
particularly concerned about their government’s repressive measures against freedom of speech.
The possibility of oppressive government measures did not allow the interviewer to tape
record the interviews. The possibility that the tape could be confiscated by the Egyptian
authorities would make the respondents highly uncomfortable and would most likely influence
their answers. Transcription of the answers allowed the respondents to answer the questions
more candidly without the uneasiness that would accompany tape recording. Handwritten notes
were taken by the interviewer in order to help make the respondents feel more at ease to answer
questions concerning sensitive issues such as democratization. The open-ended nature of the
questions required approximately two hours of transcription for each half hour interview.
The fact that the interviewer had to both ask questions and transcribe the answers was not
without its costs. It made it more difficult to observe non-verbal cues and physical gestures,
which can be helpful in capturing each nuanced response. Multitasking also made it more
difficult to ascertain is a respondent was not being honest or discreetly lying. The very nature of
handwriting increased the chances that the answers were recorded less accurately. The fact that
each response was written by hand makes it more difficult for the interviewer to record every
possible gasp, sigh, and hesitation.
Without a tape of the interviews, it was not possible for the interviewer (or additional
researchers) to listen to each interview repeatedly. The benefit of multiple interpretations of the
raw data was not possible. As the sole recorder of the data, the interviewer had to be even more
aware of the importance of non-bias. The objectivity of the interviewer is even more important
given the inability for other interpretations of the raw data collected. The interviewer maintained
their objectivity without seeming completely disassociated with the respondent. An interviewer
12

who is too formal or objective would be sacrificing sensitivity necessary to maintain the desired
informal conversational partnership. Objectivity was maintained as all questions were asked in
the same tone without non-verbal cues from the interviewer, such as nodding of the head that may
lead respondents or influence their answers.
While these drawbacks of transcription were unfortunate, they were also unavoidable.
Tape recording would have resulted in greater negative consequences in terms of reliability.
Other than making it almost impossible to find participants willing to be recorded, those who
would have agreed would not have been truthful for fear of punishment by the government.
Answers especially related to the political situation in Egypt would have been restricted and
limited to a more positive description for fear of repercussions by the government. Tape
recording compromises the honesty of each respondent and the rapport with the interviewer with
whom they already regard with suspicion. These costs are much more detrimental to the study
than missing non-verbal cues associated with transcription.
Even with the precautions of handwritten notes, there is still a possibility that the
respondents were not honest in expressing their true opinions and feelings. Although the
interviewer is of Egyptian heritage and speaks the language, they are naturally suspicious of
foreigners who live in the U.S. (even Egyptian-Americans). It is possible that a few respondents
were fearful that the interviewer was a spy for the U.S. government. For example, respondents
may have falsely described the political system in Egypt as a democratic system in the hopes that
it will be relayed to U.S. government authorities.
The interview method is a combination of an in-depth qualitative and standardized
approach. The interviews were standard because the same questions are asked in the same order.
This maintains consistency of the subject matter and increase the reliability of the data.
Respondents were asked a standardized set of questions in order to maintain focus and a common
theme among all the interviews. Given the flexible nature of qualitative research however, open13

ended questions follow the standard questions. The exploratory approach gives each respondent
the ability to express their own interpretation of events and issues without being constrained by
the interviewer’s questions. It allowed the interviewer to deviate from the script to probe for
more detail if necessary. The respondents were not pressured to answer in brief concise terms.
This captures the individual’s feelings more completely than very rigid standardized interview
approaches.
The qualitative approach allows for a flexible and exploratory interview in which
respondents are asked open-ended questions designed to allow them to express personal
experiences and detailed stories. Questions asked such as “why?” or “why not?”, for example,
are truly open-ended and allowed each respondent to choose from a range of possible responses.
This shows what themes, examples, and words the subject associates with question in order to
describe their feelings and thoughts.30 This interview style matches the goal of the interviews,
which is not to identify an objective truth, but to understand the perception and conclusions
drawn regarding U.S. foreign policy. Each respondent’s unique interpretation will be encouraged
through the flexibility of this qualitative approach. The respondents will have the opportunity to
elaborate on their opinions and feelings in order to help the researcher understand the
explanations of their thoughts and behaviors.31
The interviewer had to balance the exploratory nature of qualitative interviewing with
another ethical consideration during the interviews. The issue concerns pressing a respondent for
information without making them feel threatened.32 Again, the environment in Egypt plays a role
in the increased level of suspicion felt by the respondents especially when being asked questions
pertaining to democratization. When faced with the decision of whether to probe further, the
30

Patton, 212.
James K. Doyle, “Introductions to Interviewing Techniques,” in Handbook for IQP Advisors and
Students [database on-line] (Worcester, MA: Worcester Polytechnic Institute, 2004) available from
http://www.wpi.edu/Academics/Depts/IGSD/IQPHbook/ch11.html (accessed 23 July 2005).
32
Rubin and Rubin, 97.
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interviewer did not want to risk the rapport with the respondent and therefore chose not to probe
further. Pushing too hard for explanations would run the risk that the respondent will lie or
distort their answers even shut down completely.33 The interviewer probed very carefully and
selectively in order to maintain a comfortable atmosphere that was necessary for rest of the
interview. Not fully covering each issue raised by each respondent may have slightly
compromised the validity of the data collected.
One drawback of in-depth qualitative interviewing is that fact that it is time consuming
and requires a great deal of effort on the part of the interviewer. This made it difficult to conduct
comprehensive interviews with a many more participants as a larger sample of those educated in
Alexandria. The seven respondents interviewed in this study represent a relatively small sample
of all of those educated in Alexandria. While their perspectives alone cannot be generalized to
the entire Egyptian population, they will be compared with those of found in mass public opinion
surveys as a more complete approach.
The researcher adhered to various ethical obligations while conducting the research. All
deception was avoided with the parameters of the research outlined before each interview. Every
respondent was verbally informed of the nature of the research and the purpose of the study. The
research was explained as an attempt to understand perceptions of democratization and U.S.
foreign policy. The respondents were also informed about how the data were to be used. They
understood that the results would be used as academic scholarly work and that their participation
was completely voluntary. The respondents were not asked to sign an informed consent form to
verify their willingness to participate. A signed written agreement would have violated the
anonymity of each respondent and broken the vital trust between the researcher and the
respondent, ultimately disrupting the research.

33

Ibid., 98.
15

There were only two criteria for the selection of respondents, education and residence.
Each respondent must have obtained a University degree and be a native of Alexandria. The
politically sensitive environment made the process of selecting the respondents is a very delicate
one, since the majority of Egyptians are highly reluctant to speak about issues such as democracy
and U.S. policies with a stranger. Getting past these barriers requires a trusted mediator to vouch
for the identity and trustworthiness of the interviewer. The interviewer contacted various
personal contacts in Egypt to assist in the random selection of other participants. Each contact
was told the same exact information regarding the purpose of the interview. They were also told
to randomly choose a willing participant based only on their education and residence. The use of
a mediator to select respondents was essential in making contacts with the respondents. Without
this critical link, the interviews would not have been possible.
There are drawbacks to this method of participant selection. The first involves the idea
that each personal contact asked to select the respondents is associated with the interviewer. This
leaves the possibility that each respondents is chosen from essentially the same pool of people.
To lessen the likelihood of this occurring, the interviewer made a conscience attempt to contact
seven different contacts who did not know one another. Another possibility is that these personal
contacts chose people whom they thought would be appropriate, rather than completely at
random. The bias of this mutual contact may have affected the selection of the respondents.
They may have chosen respondents who are more outspoken or politically knowledgeable, for
example, which may have in turn, affected the validity of the data.
The selection process resulted in seven willing participants; two from the Coptic
Orthodox Christian minority and five were from the Sunni Muslim majority. This is appropriate
given the Muslim majority in Egypt. The gender breakdown was slightly less balanced. Women
were underrepresented in the study with only one Coptic woman interviewed. The perspective of
at least one other woman would have contributed to the study by allowing for a valuable
16

comparison between answers of men and women. A perspective of a Muslim woman, therefore,
is not addressed in this particular study.
In addition, the timing of the interviews may have affected the respondents’ answers.
They took place in the summer months between June and May 2004, two years after the invasion
of Iraq by a U.S.-led coalition and the subsequent overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Larry
Diamond, who served as a Senior Advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad,
described the situation in Iraq as, “endemic violence, a shattered state, a nonfunctioning
economy, and a decimated society.”34 Part of the predicament was that Iraqis, although grateful
for the overthrow of their dictator, were suspicious of U.S. motives in their country. Many Iraqis
viewed the invasion not as liberation, but as an occupation by Western powers. This view
coupled with the U.S. policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict caused the occupation authority to lack a
considerable amount of legitimacy35 in the eyes of many Iraqis as well as other Middle
Easterners.
Like many other media outlets around the world, the Arab media shows increasing
violence and disorder in Iraq created by an opposing insurgency. Images of the horrors of war are
continuously shown throughout Egypt and the Middle East. Media outlets such as the Qatarbased news channel, Al-Jazeera, often show images of injured Iraqi women and children as well
as destroyed homes as a result of the war. Respondents who may have been recently exposed to
these images may have a more negative perception of U.S. democratization policy. The effects of
media exposure on perceptions may be short-term and not necessarily reflect long-term deeply
held beliefs. To adequately examine this point, perceptions must be studied over time to account
for surrounding events that may have temporarily influenced their political attitude. It was not
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possible to interview each respondent more than once to explore whether their perceptions were
maintained over time.
A respondent’s interpretation of a question or specific word within the question may have
also been a determining factor. For example, the term “democratization” may denote a negative
connotation for a respondent who may consider the concept as foreign or an idea imposed from
the outside. In addition, one question asks the respondents why they think the U.S. has enacted a
democratization policy. This may have led them to consider alternative reasons (other than
democracy promotion) that they may not have thought of otherwise.

Documented Survey Analysis
The interview questions were similar to questions asked in a mass survey conducted a
year earlier. This allows for a valuable comparison of data with many benefits. The combination
of results from two kinds of inquiry provides more complete picture of Egyptian political
attitudes. Interview results of the political attitudes of the educated elite in Alexandria will be
compared to those of the masses surveyed in Cairo. How do the educated respondents compare
with the opinion of the masses? How are they similar or different? Similar attitudes suggest that
there is continuity among the educated elite and the masses on issues concerning U.S.
democratization policy. The benefit of incorporating the quantitative results of the survey with
the interview findings also allows for greater applicability to the general population and an
increased ability to generalize the findings from the interviews.
Another extremely beneficial outcome of combining the qualitative findings is the ability
to facilitate the interpretations of a quantitative approach. While the mass survey established that
a majority have negative public opinions of the U.S. and its policies, it does not provide
comprehensive reasons that account for this sentiment. The qualitative study helps to explain the
underlying factors behind this broad relationship. The complex nature of a person’s perception
18

requires a more in-depth approach than quantitative survey research. Comprehensive interviews
will more adequately explore the reasons behind the respondents’ answers as well as non-verbal
elements of behavior, which is naturally overlooked in quantitative analysis. Survey findings are
supplements with comprehensive personal narratives that provide a deeper look as to why and
how these perspectives may have been formed. The interview process allows for a nuanced and
intricate understanding of the perception of each respondent. The respondents have an
opportunity to answer the same questions asked in the survey, only this time, with the added
value of using their own words. The benefit giving them a choice of words and explanations is
having complete understanding of their perspective without limits that naturally accompany
close-ended questions.
The results of the survey conducted by Professor Shibley Telhami from the University of
Maryland for the Zogby International organization and will be the basis for a valuable
comparison. From February 19 to March 11, 2003, the survey was distributed among the mass
population in the Middle East.36 The questions focused on perceptions of the U.S. and its policies
abroad and were conducted in six Arab countries, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, the
United Arab Emirates, and Lebanon, surveying a total of 3,020 men and women.37 The results
show similar that public opinion was similar in all of the countries surveyed.
The total sample size in Egypt is 700 and consists of respondents who filled out
questionnaires in Cairo, the capital city.38 All respondents were above 18 years of age with the
gender composition based on that of the Egyptian population. The sample was selected based on
a Systematic Random Sampling Scheme because of the lack of a population census. The
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stratified random sample selection ensured that the probability will be proportional to the size
(PPS) of the population in the selection of both males and females and Muslim and Coptic
Christians. Of the three strata of economic social classes surveyed, there were 274 in the low
social class, 147 in the middle class and 279 in the high class. Of that sample 20 were Coptic
Christian in the low social class, 6 in the middle and 17 in the high class. The margin of error is
+/- 3.8 percent.39 The selection of respondents from various categories including economic class,
religious affiliation, and gender, ensures that a wide array of people is represented. This allows
for the results of the survey to be applied to the larger population.
The results show that anti-Americanism is at an all-time high with both the U.S. and its
policies are viewed favorably. Less than 6 percent of the respondents believed that the United
States was waging a campaign in Iraq to create a more democratic Arab world. Close to 95
percent were convinced that the motivation was control of Arab oil and the subjugation of the
Palestinians to Israel’s will. A major source of negative attitudes is resentment of U.S. policy
toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and deep mistrust of American intentions in Iraq.”40
The mistrust of American intentions in Iraq is also accompanied by pessimism about the
outcome of the war. Asked if the result of the war would bring more or less democracy, only 2
percent of Moroccans, 3 percent of Saudis, and 6 percent of Egyptians believed that the Middle
East would be more democratic after the war.41 These views surely provide evidence that the
U.S. public diplomacy campaign has not succeeded in changing the negative views of the U.S. in
the region.42
The findings of this survey in Egypt show that that Egyptian public opinion towards the
U.S. is highly unfavorable with only 13 percent who expressed a favorable opinion compared to
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79 percent who expressed an unfavorable view. When asked whether this opinion is based on
U.S. foreign policy or their own values, the results were more evenly divided with 43 percent
basing it on their values and 46 percent on U.S. policy.43 This shows a clear indication that the
majority of Egyptians surveyed have a negative view of the U.S. What is less clear, however, is
what the majority of Egyptians base their opinion on; their own values or U.S. policies.
Other questions asked in this survey concentrated on the issue of the U.S.-led war in Iraq.
The findings show that 63 percent of Egyptians felt that the war with Iraq would bring less
democracy and three-fourths (79 percent) say the war will bring less peace to the Middle East. In
addition, 74 percent of the Egyptians surveyed believed that the war would cause more terrorism
toward the U.S.44 These findings show that the majority of Egyptians surveyed are pessimistic
about the prospect of democracy and peace in the Middle East after the U.S.-led war in Iraq.
One drawback from Telhami’s mass survey is indicative of the nature of close-ended
questions. The kinds of questions chosen for the study provide preconceived categories to which
each respondent must conform. They must also choose from the answers provided in the study,
which may also lead them to consider options they may not have otherwise. When asked about
the U.S.-led war in Iraq, for example, the option of “less democracy” may cause a respondent to
consider that as a possible outcome of the war and may have influenced their answer. Also, the
respondent does not have the ability to show to what extent they agree with the statement. As
with all social science research, it is always a possibility that a respondent will not answer
truthfully. The promise of confidentiality, however, most likely alleviates most fears associated
with a repressive political environment.
Exploring the perceptions of educated individuals allows for a valuable comparison with
data from this mass public opinion survey. The combination of both qualitative and quantitative
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analysis gives a holistic understanding of Egyptian public opinion, including both the masses and
the educated elite. The research will provide valuable insights essential for those seeking to
capture the hearts and minds of the peoples of the Middle East and reverse the rise of antiAmerican sentiment.
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

The Importance of Political Culture
There have been various theoretical and empirical studies conducted on the significance
of political culture and public opinion. In The Civic Culture (1963), Gabriel Almond and Sidney
Verba were among the first to empirically study the affects of attitudes and beliefs of citizens on
the viability of democratic institutions. They theorized that peoples’ belief in three main areas
comprise their civic culture; the ability to influence political decisions, feelings of positive affect
of the political system, and belief that other citizens are basically trustworthy. They took a
psychological and individualistic approach through survey research methods in a cross-national
context by examining the U.S., Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Mexico.45 The Civic Culture
described the term “parochial” as an individual who is more involved in his family or community
and expects very little from government.46 Satisfaction would be a result of personal efforts or
because of another institution such as the family.
Almond and Verba found that countries with a high level of these civic culture attitudes
are more likely to adopt and sustain democracy over time than countries with low levels
regardless of socioeconomic factors. They concluded that, “Unless the political culture is able to
support a democratic system, the chances for the success of that system is slim.”47 These findings
have significantly contributed to the study of political culture by emphasizing the importance of a
society’s normative evaluations of a political system.
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Almond and Verba’s work has a few shortcomings, however, due to its limited focus of
traditional questions regarding democratic theory that reflect their bias in favor of stable
democracies. Their view of political culture is quite simplistic by suggesting that a society is
either conducive to democracy or not. They lack a nuanced approach that takes into account
varying stages of political culture throughout the democratization process. To explain the
complex nature of political culture they use overly simplistic categories including terms such as
parochial, subject or participant.48 This fails to take into account the possibility of distinct
variations of political culture due to various sub-groups within society.
Later works such as Political Culture and Political Development (1965) provided a more
nuanced approach to the study of political culture. Pye and Verba sought to go beyond the study
of formal structures and institutions of politics and focus on the “beliefs that affect the ways in
which people act with these political institutions.”49 Political beliefs both affect and are affected
by the manner in which political structures operate. A nation’s political culture is affected by the
experiences that individuals have with the political process. This leads to the study of the
learning experiences that allow political culture to be passed down from one generation to the
next. This includes a nation’s political history and how political beliefs are affected by the
memories of political events.50
Sidney Verba explains how political events are perceived and interpreted by people who
have previously held beliefs.51 Political history is described as a series of events interpreted
differently by different people depending on their beliefs. Political beliefs are based on general
values, norms, emotional attachments which affect the manner in which individuals become
involved in a political system. Both meaning and interpretation are critical to how a person
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perceives external political events. Political culture is a part of the larger culture of a society and
includes general values not related to political life.52
Verba also introduces dimensions of how to analyze political culture on a national level.
The first concerns the first and most basic issue, national identity, which is the extent to which an
individual considers them self a member of a nation-state. If this sense of identity is strong, it
legitimizes the activities of national leaders and makes it possible for them to mobilize the
support of its followers. The second dimension is an individual’s identification with fellow
citizens, which is the sense of integration that a person has with others in the political system. A
country in which individuals have confidence in other citizens as political actors is a critical
aspect of a democratic political culture. Another dimension concerns beliefs about governmental
output. This concerns a citizen’s expectation of what the government ought to do for them.
These expectations can range from absolutely no governmental expectations to the strong
desirability of governmental activity. The last dimension concerns the process of making
decisions. This is the beliefs about the way in which the government makes decisions. In some
societies, citizens know very little about how decisions are made and have no desire to learn. In
this situation they consider themselves “subjects of the government rather than participants with a
legitimate voice in deciding what the government does.”53 These dimensions are a valuable
foundation for future studies of political culture and will later be used to analyze this study’s
findings.
This study also focused on differences among groups within one national culture and the
process of disaggregating the political culture of a society. They analyzed elites and masses
separately in order to study the differences or similarities between them in each country. They
examined the political culture of six countries: Turkey, India, England, Ethiopia, Egypt and Japan
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and found multiple political cultures in each.54 These findings have laid the foundation for later
empirical studies to compare political cultures of sub-groups including elites and masses using
behavioral approach. They emphasize the importance of statistically significant survey research
that adheres to strict methodological guidelines to produce quantifiable results. The intent is to
illuminate researcher personal bias and develop scientifically sound conclusions that can be
replicated and verified. The behavioral approach has considerable scientific merits especially
with regard to its methodological accuracy and generalizability. Nevertheless, behavioralism
alone can not fully capture the complexity of issues inherent in social science and political culture
in particular. Comprehensive qualitative and area studies approaches add the depth and rich
detail crucial to the study of a society as well as the political attitudes of individuals within that
society.
In Political Culture and Political Development, Leonard Binder examines the political
culture of Egypt after the 1952 National Revolution. In the early 1960s, during the Nasser
regime, Binder found that university graduates seemed to have a general liberal and parliamentary
attitude regarding politics.55 Both the educated citizens and government leaders were attempting
to mix traditional Egyptian values with the values of the West. They sought to modernize
without sacrificing important social and personal values related to tradition.56 The government
chose to sacrifice traditional values in order to face its problems and international environment.
That caused educated Egyptians to keep their traditional sentiments as private affairs and in areas
of their social life. Traditional values were not for public discussion or of concern of the
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government. Demographic and economic problems facing the government as well as the dignity
of the nation were of central importance, not the personal matters of the individual.57
The result was a political culture of educated Egyptians as one that did not identify with
the acts of the government. The private lives of the educated were only minimally integrated
with their political lives. Educated Egyptians perceived the government as “the private affair of
President’s Nasser’s own inner circle”58 making it nearly impossible to enter this inner circle of
trusted advisors. That the individual must adjust to what the government decides to do even if
considered unsatisfactory. Governmental decisions should be tolerated even if they are
uncomfortable to the individual because it is most likely what is good for Egyptians.59
Binder also explained how Egyptians from the educated classes consider their
government as a source of pride regarding its international accomplishments. They were quiet
pleased with the increased influence of Egypt in international affairs. The fact that the great
powers such as Britain and France took great interest in Egypt and rather concerned about the rest
of the Middle East added to this sense of pride. Most importantly, they understood that the
neighboring Arab states feared and respected Nasser as a leader in the Arab world.60 The
increased prominence of Egypt in the international arena delighted these citizens who were
subjected to colonial rule for many years prior.
Nevertheless Binder maintains that the political culture of this sub-group of Egyptian
society was largely based on the idea of disassociation with the political process. Political
support for the Nasser regime was, for the most part, passive and lacking opportunities for
participation rendering the government, “relatively distant, cold object hover much its leaders
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may appear psychologically familiar and warm.”61 The educated individual cannot participate in
the Egyptian government as a member of a group offering an alternative policy. This is because
there is only one policy and everyone must conform to it. The only way special interests can be
pursued, is if an organization that represents those interests has the ability to penetrate the
exclusive administration of the government bureaucracy.62 This created a situation in which the
educated in Egypt accommodated themselves to the policies of the government without
participating in the political process.
Binder also explained Egyptian political culture as an interactive mix of the distinctive
orientations of many groups such as the middle and lower class as well as the bureaucratic elite.
These findings provide evidence that sub-groups within a society may have different political
cultures and varying perceptions. This reiterates the importance of the present analysis that
explores the perceptions of members of distinct sub-group in Egypt. However, Binder’s study is
quite outdated and does not account for recent changes in the international and domestic arena.
The current interview research explores whether the respondents still feel disconnected with their
government today and whether they continue to show signs of apathy towards the political
process.
Another more recent work was conducted by Joshua Stacher in the summer of 2001 in
The Arab Studies Quarterly. He examines the contemporary political culture in Egypt by
studying the political beliefs and values of two separate groups in society, the elites and the
masses. He defines the 'masses' with terms such as the “popular” sector, “man in the street”, or
the “silent majority” and the elites as “intellectuals who are educated and frequently writing or
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publicly commenting on political events or trends in contemporary Egypt.”63 His aim was to find
the cause for the apathetic political culture often alienated from the political process during the
current Mubarak presidency. His theory rests on the idea that Egyptian political culture is not
conducive to democracy due to the repressive government that alienates the masses as well as the
elite to prevent the development of grassroots movements for democracy. 64
Stacher offers many reasons to account for the apathetic Egyptian society. He first
identifies many tactics used by Egyptian political leadership to stifle democratic political culture
among the masses often called the “silent majority.”65 The Egyptian government deters political
participation through intense media campaigns that negatively depict members of civil society
groups, especially in the area of human rights, often by referring to them to as immoral or
thieves.66 Fear of punishment is also used as a tool to keep people to stay away from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and political activist groups.67 This further suppresses any
prospects for democratic political culture by deterring citizens from working with human rights
activists or participating in pro-democracy groups. Other repressive government measures in
Egypt are more direct. Teachers who have attempted to conduct workshops on the use
democratic tools in the classroom, for example, have been detained for up to 24 hours and
punished by taking 15 days of pay off their salaries.68 Punishment is also used by the government
to exclude and isolate members of society from politics and nongovernmental organizations.
This type of system has a devastating effect on a democratic political culture and on
democracy as a whole. People who are attempting to participate in the politics through formal
channels become frustrated and disenchanted by the entire political process. The results is that
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accepting authoritarianism becomes and easier choice and therefore, emerges as the normal and
acceptable behavior.69 As a result, it is a common phenomenon in Egypt to be politically
apathetic and personally uninterested in the state and its political activities.
Stacher’s field research continues an analysis of Egyptian political culture by
concentrating on a very significant group in society with regards to democratic ideals, the
intellectuals. He suggests that since the 1952 national revolution, political and economic changes
have affected Egyptian intellectual society. They have lacked a unified vision, which has
reinforced the mass culture of political alienation and immobilization.70 These intellectuals are
divided and are unable to reach a consensus about what an acceptable government constitutes.
This shows that there are indeed separate sub-groups within Egypt that may have a distinct
political culture.
This study show that the divisions within Egyptian intellectual political culture lack
direction and unity about how to lay the foundations of democracy and result in an inability to
force the existing regime to make significant reforms. One branch of elites favors what he refers
to as the “Arab Concept” of democracy instead of the Western approach, in which powerful
ruling elite would have ability to mobilize the masses while not being susceptible to checks and
balances like in many Western democracies. The lack of governmental checks and balances
describes a system resembling an elitist form of democracy. Others believe that democracy
requires a pan-Arab nation while another sect equates democracy with social justice. These
substantial divisions in Egyptian intellectual circles have done very little to promote a unified
voice for democratic progress or promote a democratic political culture among the masses.71
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Stacher sees the presidencies of Nassar, Sadat, and Mubarak as maintaining and
strengthening authoritarianism after independence from colonialism and the establishment of an
independent nation-state in 1952. He attributes their leadership as contributing to the present
state of society saying that their reign:
Helps explain the apathetic, alienated, and immobile mass political culture, in
combination, with the ambivalent behavior and schizophrenic attitudes of the intellectualelite sub-group who appear to become more entrenched in the system.72
Thus, he concludes accurately, that the lack of clear direction and aim of the Egyptian political
culture allows the unrepresentative political system to prevail unchallenged. He believes that the
widespread apathy among society is a consequence of historical and contemporary events that
have affected their beliefs and values about democracy.
Stacher’s work provides a comprehensive study of the political culture of Egyptian
society. The apathetic nature among intellectuals can be seen as a consequence of historical and
contemporary events that influence their beliefs and values about democracy. His study does not
examine the possible effects of external events on political culture. These findings provide a
valuable framework for even more current research of Egyptian society and political culture that
takes into account perceptions of outside forces such as U.S. democratization policy.

Mass Public Opinion Surveys
Mass public opinion surveys have been conducted throughout the Middle East in order to
examine the political culture of the general population. A large sample of respondents that is
randomly selected allows for a valuable generalization to be made about the larger population.
One public opinion poll found the Egyptian political culture to be apathetic in a 1995 study
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conducted by the Egyptian newspaper, Al-Ahram Weekly.73 The poll sampled the views of 1,505
randomly chosen men and women from Cairo’s two main railway stations in Ramses and Giza
and assured of anonymity. Those surveyed varied in both age and education level. There were
mixed results regarding domestic political issues and the Egyptian multi-party system. Support
for the multi-party system was evident as 73 percent agreed that it was beneficial with only 14
percent disagreeing and 13 percent with no opinion. This contradicts the results of another
question that asked if the current multi-party system under Mubarak was useful as only 36
percent agreed with that statement and the larger 46 percent replied that it was not. Political
alienation was confirmed further when only 36 percent could identify a political party that
represented them and 40 percent claimed that no political party represented them.74 These
answers are surprising given the fact that Egypt maintains that there are fourteen fullyfunctioning political parties. The reality, however, is that these parties are substantially
ineffective because they do not represent the interests of many Egyptian citizens who feel
completely disassociated with them and desire to remain outside of the political system.
Another opinion poll conducted by the Group for Democratic Development in October
1996 surveyed 5,100 respondents in seven electoral districts in Egypt by random sampling
methods.75 This survey found that 88 percent of those surveyed were not participating or
affiliated with a political party and 94.32 percent were not participating or affiliated with a civil
society organization.76 These findings support the argument that the masses in Egypt are indeed
apathetic and uninterested in changing in the political status quo.
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The findings in these polls show clearly that there is little of support for political parties
in Egypt. The majority of citizens do not utilize political parties as a tool for meaningful
participation. Stacher attributes this to society’s general perception is that the political parties are
as autocratic as the government and not representative of the diverse sectors of society.77 He
blames the Mubarak government for contributing to this gap by enacting restrictions and financial
obstacles for opposition parties ultimately preventing them from mobilizing vital popular
support.78
Recent studies of political culture and public opinion account for more recent global
events like September 11th and the U.S.-led war in Iraq. Survey research shows that mass public
opinion in the Arab world has become increasingly skeptical of American intentions in the
region. One researched public opinion in 44 countries between July and October 2002. It was
conducted by The Pew Global Attitudes Project is called “What the World Thinks in 2002: How
Global Publics View Their Lives, Their Countries, The World, America.”79 It has contributed
very significant findings about perceptions around the world. For the purpose of this study, only
findings from Egypt are relevant and will be discussed.
Conducted in October 2002, this survey was conducted in Cairo and its surrounding
areas. The questions were asked in face-to-face interviews spoken in the Arabic language with
the respondents being adults between the ages of 18-60. The total sample size was 1,013 with a
3.1% margin of error.80 Its results show that the great majority of Egyptians have an unfavorable
view of the U.S. The results show that 69 percent had an unfavorable view and only 6 percent
had a favorable view (compared to Telhami’s survey that found 79 percent and 13 percent

77

Stacher, 88.
Ibid., 95
79
Public Opinion Poll, The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “What the World Thinks in
2002: How Global Publics View Their Lives, Their Countries, The World, America,” (Washington D.C.:
2002), 1-89.
80
Ibid.
33
78

respectively). When compared to opinions about Americans, Egyptians surveyed showed views
nearly as negative with only 13 percent expressing a favorable view. The Pew Research Center
also found that in Egypt, Muslims are more likely to have an unfavorable view of the U.S. than
non-Muslims.81 In regards to the U.S. foreign policy and specifically the war on terror, the results
are also significant. When asked if U.S. foreign policy considers others, only 17 percent of
Egyptians answered ‘yes’ and 66 percent answered ‘no’. Egyptians surveyed had an even more
negative view of the U.S.-led war on terrorism with only 5 percent favoring it and 79 percent
opposing it.82
When asked about their view regarding the spread of American ideas and customs,
Egyptians surveyed gave some the most negative impressions of all the countries surveyed (only
Pakistan showed a less positive view). Only 6 percent of all Egyptian respondents felt that the
wide diffusion of U.S. ideas and customs was a good thing.83 The question about U.S.-style
democracy was permitted in all countries surveyed except Egypt, which shows the censorship of
Egyptian government. Overall the Egyptians surveyed had some of the most negative views of
both U.S. policies and ideas. This leads one to believe that the Egyptian government’s alliance
with the U.S. is not representative with the wishes of the majority of its people.
Other significant findings include the latest in a series of surveys by the Pew Research
Center for the People and the Press. It researched a wide variety of countries besides the U.S.
including European countries such as Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia as well as
Turkey, Morocco, Jordan, and Pakistan from the greater Middle East and North Africa.84
Telephone interviews were conducted among adults (18 years or older) as a representative
nationwide sample of 1,000 in the U.S., 500 in Great Britain, 504 in France, and 500 in
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Germany.85 Face-to-face interviews were conducted from a representative nationwide sample of
1,000 adults in Jordan, 1,002 in Russia, and 1,017 in Turkey while the sample of 1,000 adults
interviewed in Morocco was solely urban and in Pakistan, predominately urban.86
Conducted from February 19 to March 3, 2004, the survey showed discontent with
America and its policies increasing even further since the war in Iraq in both Europe and the
greater Middle East. Most respondents from countries other than the U.S. expressed significant
skepticism of U.S. motives for its anti-terror campaign. The predominantly Muslim countries still
remained angry toward the U.S. with majorities in all four countries doubting the sincerity of the
war on terrorism saying that the policy is an effort to control oil in the Middle East and dominate
the world. Oil is mentioned most often as a U.S. motive for the war on terror with a majority in
seven of the nine countries making that claim.87
The survey also found that the majorities in five countries surveyed say that the U.S. war
on terrorism has been enacted so that it can dominate the world including Jordan (61%), Turkey
(61%), and Morocco (60%). Approximately half of the respondents from Muslim countries give
two other ulterior motives for the American anti-terror campaign such as, “helping Israel and
targeting unfriendly Muslim governments.”88 This shows that there has been little change in the
opinions of respondents in these countries about the war in Iraq with opposition nearly universal.
Another interesting finding shows that Americans have a far different view of the impact
of the war in Iraq than do all other people in the other surveyed countries. While Americans
generally believed that the Iraq war has helped the fight on terrorism, there is a broad agreement
among other countries that it actually hurt the anti-terror campaign.89 Another point of
divergence is the impact of the Iraq war on America’s image in the world. The majority of
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Americans felt that the war showed the power of the U.S. military and revealed their country as a
trustworthy supporter of democracy around the world while at least half of the respondents in the
eight other countries view the U.S. as less trustworthy and its military prowess generally not
viewed in a positive light as a result of the war.90 There is a wide gap of perceptions between
many in the greater Middle East (and in Europe) and the majority of Americans.
Other interesting public opinion poll findings include research conducted by the Gallup
Poll organization three months after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Ten thousand
residents of nine predominantly Muslim countries were interviewed face-to-face. The results
show that 74% of respondents did not believe that the Arabs were involved with the September
11th terrorist attacks.91 There was a great deal of skepticism among those surveyed about who
were responsible for the attacks on the U.S. Egypt was not included in this particular survey
making it unclear whether Egyptians would also fall into this category
Cameron Brown provides a thorough analysis of this Gallup Poll in the article, “Middle
Eastern Anti-Americanism, September 11 and After.” Three main events are explained to
account for the anti-American sentiment among Arabs and Muslims: reactions to the September
11th terrorist attacks, U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, and 2003 Gulf war in Iraq.92 This paper
claims that reactions in the Middle East are distinct from those of the rest of the world for two
reasons. The first is the idea that the majority of Middle Eastern reactions placed the blame
primarily on mistaken U.S. foreign policy rather than on the mistaken doctrines of the terrorists.93
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Since U.S. foreign policy is perceived as the root cause of the attacks, they suggest that the U.S.
should learn from this experience and change its disruptive policies in the region.94
The second feature that distinguishes the general reaction in the Middle East concerning
the September 11th attacks deals with Arab self-conception. The majority of people in the region
feel that they have been victims of aggression by various powers for many years. Although the
region formally condemned the attacks and expressed regret for the loss of American life, Brown
continues, the widespread notion was that the U.S. was experiencing only a small fraction of the
pain that has been felt by Arabs for many years. He cites a widely circulated newspaper in
Amman, Jordan called Al-Ra’y, described this sentiment by stating,
Perhaps what happened in the United States yesterday should serve as a reminder of the
ongoing acts of oppression, aggression, killing, suppression, and starvation in the land of
Palestine.95
Other newspapers like Al-Safir in Beirut, Lebanon have also cited raids by American fighters in
Iraq, Libya, and Lebanon as additional examples of how U.S. foreign policy has continuously
victimized Arab people.96
The most significant contribution in Brown’s work to the present study is the discussion
of widespread conspiracy theories permeating throughout the entire region. Writers suggested
various extraordinary schemes about concerning who was really responsible for the attacks. One
conspiracy theory claimed that the attacks must have been orchestrated by someone within the
insider knowledge of U.S. aviation and communication systems such as the U.S. government
itself. While others claimed that the accuracy and preciseness of the attacks concluded that there
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must have been bombs strategically planted inside the buildings by domestic American
extremists.97
The most repeated conspiracy theory in the region in the media and among average
citizens deemed the Israelis as perpetrators of the attacks. The rationale behind the Israeli attack
was perceived as a means to “push the American people, President Bush, and NATO to submit
even more to the Jewish Zionist ideology…”98 Some thought that even if the Arabs were
responsible for the attacks, the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad was behind them. The
motivation was described as follows, “The Israeli regime knows that only by inflicting such a
wound and blaming it on ‘Islamic terror’ could it wipe out any dissent to current American
policy.”99 The prevalence of these conspiracy theories continued in the region despite the 2001
Al-Jazeera broadcast of a videotape showing Al-Qaeda terrorist leader, Osama Bin Laden,
gloating about the success of the attacks.100
Brown explains that while there may be a variety of competing theories and
disagreements about who was responsible for the terrorist attacks, there seems to be widespread
agreement in the region that the Arabs or the Muslims could not have been responsible. Many
Middle Eastern writers and journalists claim that no one in the Arab world is skilled or capable
enough to perform such a complex operation. This illustrates that Arab self-conception is that of
being incompetent and incapable. 101
While Brown’s work provides an insightful analysis of conspiracy theories in the Middle
East after September 11th, it neglects to provide a comprehensive analysis of what shapes their
perceptions. She fails to give useful answers as to the reasons behind this self-conception of
incompetence. By not thoroughly examining the reasons behind the conspiracy theories, Brown
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seemingly depicts Arabs as irrational and illogical. The present study seeks to fill these gaps by
providing a thorough analysis of the perception of each respondent including how and why they
were formed.
While these surveys provide valuable data as to ‘what’ the perceptions are of the general
mass population, they fail to give sophisticated answers as to ‘why’ and ‘to what extent’. They
do not allow each respondent the freedom to use their own words to describe events, feelings,
opinions, and interpretations. They must choose a close-ended answer that best describes their
perception, in effect, not allowing a unique personal narrative to develop and standardizing the
concept of perception.

Perspectives of Two Egyptian Intellectuals
There have been interviews conducted with individual people in Egypt allowing them to
express their unique perception of the U.S. and its foreign policies. A recent 2003 interview with
one of Egypt’s best known intellectuals, Ahmed Kamal Aboulmagd, in the New York Times
clearly expresses the “Arab world’s despair.”102 The former Senior Aid to former President Sadat
and consultant to the United Nations and has spent more than twenty years working on projects
aimed at promoting dialogue between Western and Arab civilizations. He claims that America’s
Arab friends have never felt so estranged from the United States. He says that “people in Egypt
and many parts of the Arab world used to love America, and now they have a sense of being
betrayed, misunderstood, and taken lightly.”103
Like many Egyptian intellectuals of his generation, Aboulmagd has studied American
democracy and political values and has long considered it a model to follow. His view seems to
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be rapidly changing as a reaction to current U.S. foreign policy. Aboulmagd claims that he can
no longer defend the U.S. in the present situation and says,
To most people in this area, the United States is the source of evil on planet earth. And
whether we like it or not, it is the Bush administration that is to blame.104
He claims that the U.S.-led war in Iraq is widely seen by the Arab world as an attack on all Arabs
and Muslims by President Bush and his fellow Christians. As an intellectual that has previously
pushed for American ideals, Aboulmagd says that he is unable to do so anymore because of the
widespread mistrust of the U.S. throughout the region.
Aboulmagd belongs to a sub-group of educated Egyptians that could serve as a prodemocracy partner for the Bush administration’s policy in the Arab world.105 Such language from
a long-time moderate among the Egyptian elite can be seen as a warning sign of the deep distress
among many in the Arab world. Similar opinions are common among Arab businessmen,
university professors, and senior government officials. These are precisely the people that could
help the Bush administration’s mission to bring democracy to the entire Middle East.106 This
interview provides an in-depth view of one individual’s perception and may be similar to others
in Egypt.
A similar 2004 article in the Christian Science Monitor presents the perception of Ahmed
Ibrahim, an Egyptian businessman of who also used to love America and had always dreamed of
living there.107 In the past, he had always thought of the U.S. as a good model for Egypt to follow
and imagined similar freedoms for both himself and his family.
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Over the past year, Ibrahim says has changed his perspective calling the U.S. “an enemy
of democracy in his region.”108 As a successful businessman in his mid-30s, he believes that the
U.S. no longer stands for democracy. He points to previous U.S. policies as reasons for the
change in his attitude. He describes how the U.S. once supported the Shah of Iran as the leader of
the country before abandoning him. He makes a similar argument regarding the shift in U.S.
policy towards Saddam Hussein. The Iraq example is used as an example of how the U.S. again
betrayed its past alliance with Hussein by overthrowing his entire regime.109 These contradictory
U.S. policies are used as examples of hypocrisy and reasons of why not to trust America’s
intentions in the region today.
Ibrahim’s stance is that the U.S. is not consistent between its rhetoric and its actions and
therefore, he deduces, there must be other hidden motives. He claims that the U.S. may proclaim
democracy, but its hidden agenda involves controlling the Arabs in the Middle East. He
emphasizes his suspicion by saying, “now that I look back, we can see that the plan to control us
has been there all along” and “they’re just shuffling Arabs around like pieces on a game
board.”110 He claims that anti-American opinions are so intense that they are actually becoming
an all-encompassing worldview.111 The idea that the U.S. has motives to control the Middle East
has increasingly permeated throughout the region throughout the past few years and especially
since the 2003 war in Iraq.
The article sites two U.S. policies as the main causes for Arab animosity towards the U.S.
The policies towards the Palestinians and Iraq are causing the most frustration and anger in the
Middle East. Ibrahim continues his argument by criticizing the present deteriorating situation of
U.S. presence in Iraq. He claims that the U.S. does not intend to bring democracy to Iraq but
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rather is an effort to secure oil and assert its military dominance. “Now they say they’re bringing
democracy to Iraq, but it’s just getting worse and worse.”112
As part of Egypt’s small middle class, Ibrahim would be an ideal partner for the U.S. who
plans to foster democratic transformation in the region. He is not as subject to the lure of
extremist religious ideologies and genuinely wants his government to institute reforms.113
Although he is a moderate in the region, he clearly does not trust U.S. intentions as the champion
of democracy. Losing credibility in the eyes of moderates like Ibrahim will damage U.S. interests
in the region and possibly make their objectives in the region unachievable.114 This is another
individual interview that allows for an analysis of only one person’s opinions and feelings about
the U.S. and its policies. It does not allow for a valuable comparison with other moderates in
Egypt. The study of perception and political culture requires various methods of analysis to fully
capture its complexity.
The study of political culture has a history dating back to the l960s with work of Pye and
Almond. It set the foundation for future works by highlighting the importance of psychological
judgments for the political functioning of a society. Its findings were simplistic and assumed that
the political culture with be uniform throughout society. Pye and Verba’s study provided a more
nuanced approach by taking into account that elites and masses would have different political
cultures and examined a wider variety of countries. Sidney Verba has provided useful
dimensions to analyze political culture. However, this study is quite outdated and does not
account for current political culture.
Poll research conducted in the Middle East has shown to be a good indicator of
perceptions of the masses in the relatively understudied region. It quantifies the findings of the
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close-ended questions for a representative sample of the entire population. The interviews that
have been cited above can be reduced to anecdotal evidence. The do not use systematic
methodology among several cases. It is therefore incapable of method of comparison without the
ability to find patterns among perspectives. One individual interview lacks the ability to
consistently examining many subjects using the same questions. It does not provide meaningful
data to be analyzed and will not contribute social science research more broadly.
Qualitative interviewing of individual educated Egyptians seeks to fill these gaps found
in previous research. It highlights the importance of a comprehensive approach to political
culture. The concept of democratization is explored through the eyes of members from the
educated elite in Egyptian society. The interviews provide what poll research lacks; a nuanced
and comprehensive approach to complex meanings and interpretations which are unique to
personal narratives. This method provides answers to why opinions have been formed using the
respondents’ own words. It penetrates the mind of individuals within a vital group in a political
culture model and provides a deeper understanding of the evaluative and normative aspects of
their perceptions.
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CHAPTER 3 A CONCISE HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

To truly understand Egyptian perceptions of U.S. foreign policy and democratization
today, a special emphasis must be given to the historical events that have helped shape them
throughout the years. These past experiences have influenced the way in which each respondent
views the U.S. and democratization and the normative judgments that accompany them.
Egyptians today are aware of past experiences of British colonialism and are significantly
affected by the Arab-Israeli conflict and the U.S. role in the conflict as well as the second Gulf
war in Iraq. Egyptian political culture cannot be examined until these events and their impacts on
political beliefs have been addressed.
Egyptians today are well aware of their ancient civilization that thrived under the reign of
the Pharaohs thousands of years ago. They are very proud of their long history and are described
by Joseph Lorenz as people with “dignity and self-assurance” which is obvious by “the
impression they give of knowing who they are and what their culture represents”.115 He claims
that this comes from an identity that has been shaped by a variety of factors. Similar to that of
other Middle Easterners, their identity is shaped partly by Islam, the connection with other Arabs,
and the victory over colonialism.
In the case of Egyptian identity there is the added consciousness that their civilization
flourished for thousands of years before the birth of Western civilization making it a unique case
in point. Ancient Egyptian civilization is an underlining theme in every Egyptian’s view of

115

Lorenz, 3.
44

themselves and the world.116 National identity is very strong as most citizens considering
themselves distinctly Egyptian. One of the most significant factors that account for Egyptian
leadership in the Arab world is the state-of-mind of the Egyptians themselves. Collectively, they
have a great sense of national purpose that expects their government to assert its leadership
among the other Arab states.117 They expect their regime to be involved in regional issues and
play an active role in relations between its neighbors.
Egypt has largely remained socially, politically, and culturally dominated by an elite
group since the ancient times. The era of European colonialism, for example, allowed the British
to control Egypt either directly or indirectly for over seventy years. Before the British occupation
in 1882, many in Egypt were headed toward constitutional rule and democracy including
measures to limit the powers of the autocratic khedive.118 These moves toward democracy were
stifled when the British sought to rule over what they saw as inferior people. They reduced their
educational budget for fear that they would become aware of their inferior status and demand
nationalist ideals.119
Forty years of British colonial rule of Egypt (1882-1922) continued a pattern of elite
dominance in Egypt. The structures of government institutions were in place without any real
political power. Constitutional rule and meaningful political participation was subdued. The
transition toward a sustainable democracy was never encouraged and most of Egyptian society
largely left out of the political process. Egypt’s experience with many years of colonialism has
contributed to the lack democratic and political development by creating a political system that
does not respond to the needs of its people. Even after British occupation formally came to an
end in 1922, Egypt’s domestic affairs were still dominated by the colonial power. British forces
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still retained its military bases in Egypt and controlled the Canal Zone as well as the country’s
foreign relations.120 They continued to restrict Egypt’s independence by interfering in domestic
politics, which “in part prevented parliamentary government and its institutions from taking root
in the political life of the country.”121
The memories of colonial rule and the struggle for independence is still a very much alive
in modern societies throughout the Middle East. Many older Egyptians remember the days of the
colonial era when they had to struggle for liberation from Western powers. These lessons are
communicated to younger generations through the national education curriculum, statues,
museums, and other memorial tributes.122 The constant reminders of colonialism keep the
memories of Western cultural dominance alive in order to protect themselves from ever being
treated as inferior again. The anti-colonial sentiment is crucial for understanding modern voices
of opposition to Western powers. It provides a backdrop to how Egyptians perceive the actions
by dominant powers of the West today.
The anti-colonialism sentiment drove the Egyptian revolution in 1952 with a military
group called the Free Officers taking over the country. They were popular because of their
nationalistic rhetoric that criticized the former ruling class for betraying the welfare of the country
to foreign interests. They promised to rid the Egypt from these foreign influences and broaden
economic opportunities for citizens. Since many of the Free Officers were not from the highest
social classes, their rise to power altered the structure of wealth and distribution. All three
Egyptian presidents, Gamal Abdul Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak, were instrumental
during this revolution. They were among the new elite who, despite their promises, maintained
the huge gap between the elite and the masses. They maintained a similar political situation as
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before national independence with a generally unresponsive government and a Parliament with
very limited powers.
While European powers were viewed negatively during the early nineteenth century, the
U.S. was mostly seen by Middle Easterners as a “beacon of hope for those aspiring to democracy
and freedom from foreign control.”123 The U.S. was seen as having no imperialist plans in the
region and representing compassionate activities such as education and health care. Even after
becoming involved in World War II and establishing military bases in the region, the U.S. was
still viewed positively as an anti-colonial power.124
U.S. support for the Zionist movement began to change its positive image in the eyes of
Middle Easterners. As the Jewish nationalist movement, Zionism was an effort to create a nationstate for Jews from around the world in the land of Palestine. This strongly conflicted with the
nationalistic aspirations of the Arab Palestinians. As the colonial power, the British created a
mandate that supported the Zionist aspirations and granted them 55 percent of Palestine.125 The
Arabs rejected this situation based on principle and saw it as a new form of Western colonialism
against them. This anti-colonial mindset is what makes the creation of Israel such a highlycharged issue for all Middle Easterners.
After World War II, the British decided to end the mandate and send the issue to the
United Nations. The result was a formal recognition of the Jewish state of Israel in the land of
Palestine on May of 1948. The U.S. was the first United Nations member to recognize Israel as a
sovereign nation-state. No other event has impacted modern Egyptian and Arab perceptions than
the establishment of Israel in what is seen as Arab land. The issue stems from the concept of
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identity for the collective consciousness of Middle Easterners.126 At a time when the region was
still recovering from the memories of Western colonialism, the establishment of a Jewish state in
the Middle East was particularly sensitive issue. It went against the aspirations of those in the
region and the plight of the Palestinians was seen as a human tragedy.127 T
he following day, the armies of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan invaded Israel in the name
of the Palestinian cause. The outcome of the war added to their sense of humiliation as the
collective Arab armies were defeated by a country they perceived to be a small temporary state.128
This was the first of five wars fought by Egypt and its Arab allies against Israel, all which ended
with the same outcome of defeat and further humiliation.
Throughout many years Egypt has had a unique relationship with Israel, which has
resulted in distinct reactions among Egyptians distinguishing their attitudes from those of other
Arabs. Since the 1930s, Egypt has committed the most effort and resources of all Arab states to
resolve the Palestinian issue. The pro-Palestinian policy is based on the idea that it is morally
right to defend the Palestinians against the loss of their homeland. That meant that for more
than fifty years, Egypt lead the struggle on “behalf of the Palestinians which has translated into
leadership in the Arab world.”129
Egypt’s first President after the national revolution laid the foundation for how the
Arab-Israeli conflict would be perceived by Egyptian for generations to come. Nasser saw the
conflict in Palestine within the framework of Western imperialism that sought to dominate
Arabs. He expressed great empathy for the plight of the Palestinians and claimed that it was
Egypt’s duty to defend them. He often said that Palestine “is not only an Arab but an Egyptian
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problem.”130 His anti-colonial statements were continuously made to all Egyptians blaming
Western colonialism for displacing the Palestinians.131 This idea was entrenched in the minds
of all Egyptians who could still vividly remember their subjugation under colonialism.
Nasser also used anti-colonial rhetoric to distract Egyptians from more pressing domestic
problems such as the denial of human and democratic rights. By pointing outward, citizens did
not concentrate on the regime’s “failure to bring about greater equality and prosperity.”132
Egypt’s domestic problems such as limited economic development, a growing gap between rich
and poor, high unemployment, and widespread corruption133 continue to this day along with the
government’s tendency to distract the public with injustices outside its borders especially relating
to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Of all the wars fought with Israel, the June 1967 war or “Six Day War” has had the most
impact on the Egyptian collective psyche. The U.S. supported Israel’s invasion of Egypt that
sought to bring about the overthrow of the Egypt’s Nasser regime, curb Arab nationalism, and to
stop the Palestinian resistance movement.134 The humiliating defeat in less than a week
devastated Egypt and cost thousands of casualties. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in the
territories of the West Bank and Gaza came under Israeli occupation.135 The war ended hopes of
a pan-Arab movement and allowed Israel to occupy additional land in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.
Egypt lost its land in the Sinai Desert and its citizens were devastated.
The humiliating defeat of 1967 was one of the most significant turning points in modern
Egyptian history. As a result, the Egyptian government completely lost its legitimacy in the eyes
of its citizens. Egypt’s defeat and loss of territory was the main cause for the growth of
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religiously inspired political activism. Muslims began to view this humiliating experience as the
culmination of 150 years of foreign intrusion in order to upset to their vision of a true Islamic
community. They began to lose faith in their government seeing it as incapable of protecting
Arab interests against dominant powers.
Another result of the 1967 war was an increased U.S. political and military role in the
Middle East. The U.S. began supporting authoritarian governments as well as increasing its
support for Israel who was seen as an enemy of the Arabs. After the war, for example, U.S. aid to
Israel increased by 450 percent.136 Resentment to various U.S. policies increased greatly because
it, “went against the aspirations of many for a more unified and powerful Arab world, progressive
governments, justice for the Palestinians, and reduced foreign influence.”137 Additionally, the
supply of advanced military technology to Israel by the U.S. was seen as evidence of a U.S.-Israel
alliance seeking to target the Arab world.
U.S. military support for Israel continued during the 1973 war launched by Egypt and
Syria. The coordinated attack was weakening Israel by causing it to retreat from the Sinai
territory. It was able to recapture the land and ultimately win the war because of U.S. massive
airlift of military equipment that was sent to aid them. It is widely understood among Egyptians
today that their 1973 loss against Israel was due to American military backing. Once again,
Egypt was not able to claim victory on behalf of the Palestinians. The failure to recover
Palestinian territories and allow Israel to continuously expand and control Jerusalem has
underlined for many Muslims the fact that they are unable to protect their lands and their religion
from repeated assaults of an imperial West.”138
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Under President Anwar Sadat, Egypt had no plans to be a leader of the pan-Arab cause.
Instead he endorsed an ‘Egypt First’ policy in which he would make decisions based only on the
national interests of Egypt. Egyptians embraced this nationalistic policy after years of Nasser’s
pan-Arab policies which they saw as “producing more costs and fewer benefits.”139 In 1978,
Sadat’s ‘Egypt First’ policy translated into a peace treaty with the Jewish state of Israel. His
decision to make peace with Israel in the Camp David Accords was based on what he saw as
Egyptian national interests. This was hardly reflective of Egyptian public opinion at the time. As
the first Arab state to make peace with the state of Israel, Egypt quickly a U.S ally receiving
billions of dollars of foreign aid every year. The peace treaty also caused Egypt’s influence in the
Middle East to decline as it was expelled from the Arab League by other Arab member states who
felt betrayed by the act. Although the two countries are formally at peace, the great majority of
Egyptians today still do not agree with this policy. Sadat ultimately gave his life for this peace
treaty after he was assassinated in 1981 by Muslim extremists.
On the domestic front, Sadat continued the repressive domestic environment during a
September 1981 crackdown on approximately 1,500 Egyptians from all sectors of society
including both intellectuals and Islamists. He explained that citizens had to "understand that
democracy has its own teeth. The next time is going to be ten times as ruthless."140
Today both foreign policy and Egyptian political attitudes are identifying more with
broader Arab world. The increased identification with other Arabs in the region is based on
pragmatism rather than idealism. Arab unity is seen as beneficial for Egyptian political and
economic interests.141 Egyptians are impacted by the Arab media that shows repeated images of
Israeli human rights violations against Palestinian cities and villages including military closures,
139

Ibrahim Karawan, “Identity and Foreign Policy: The Case of Egypt,” in Identity and Foreign Policy in
the Middle East, eds. Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2002), 165.
140
James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, eds., Politics in the Middle East 4th ed. (NY: Harper Collins
Publishers, 1994), 224.
141
Lorenz, 119.
51

roadblocks, Jewish-only housing settlements, and targeted assassinations that have led to a
devastated economy.142
Under the reign of President Mubarak, Egypt can be defined as a “single-party
bureaucratized state” where a single government party that dominates the political process.143
Opposition parties are significantly restricted without the ability to effectively influence political
decision-making. The constitution, however, refers to the country as a democratic and socialist
Arab republic in which the president is supported by a National Assembly of at least 350
members. The National Assembly nominates the president whose name is added to a national
referendum for the general population. To be declared president, the candidate must win a simple
majority of votes. The original constitution regulated a president to two six-year terms until it
was amended by Sadat. The amendment allows a president to be reelected for an unspecified
number of terms. Mubarak has benefited from this amendment having been “elected” for a fourth
six-year term since 1981.144 This has led to the dominance of the executive and unchecked power
of the state.
It is clear that modern perceptions in Egypt have grown out of 2,500 years of foreign rule.
Every occupier had one characteristic in common; feelings of superiority toward the Egyptian
people.145 Political culture today is strongly rooted in the anti-colonial past with a resistance to
foreign control.146 After colonialism, Egypt’s government has been remarkably stable allowing
each individual leader to remain in power for decades. Consequently, political attitudes will stem
from these historical factors shaping future perceptions regarding issues such as democratization.
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CHAPTER 4 RESULTS

Demographic Analysis of the Interviews
The first method will analyze the respondents’ answers using demographic variables such
as religion, political party affiliation, and whether a respondent has visited the U.S. Background
and demographic questions identify the characteristics of the person and help the interviewer
understand a respondent in relation to other people. Of the seven respondents, five were Muslim
and two were Coptic Orthodox Christian. It is appropriate that the majority of respondents be
Muslim because the great majority of Egyptians (approximately 90 percent) follow Islam.
Nonetheless, it is important to examine the two Coptic respondents and to find whether they
shared similar perspectives about democratization and the U.S. role in the process. Do the Coptic
Christian respondents share a sharply different viewpoint than the other Muslim respondents?
There has been a great deal of literature on whether religion affects the political culture in
the Middle East. Many scholars have concluded that Islam causes Middle Easterners to be antiWestern, anti-democratic and anti-modern. Simon Murden, for example, insists that Muslims
need to synthesize with modernization that cannot be separated from Westernization in order to
avoid what he deems as isolation and backwardness.147 Other scholars have also claimed that
Islam is inherently incompatible with the West and will always be in opposition to it. Feelings of
anti-Americanism are seen as directly stemming from the Islamic faith. Various Middle East
experts have repeatedly written about Islam and its inability to incorporate Western ideas and
principles without conducting substantial field studies in the region.
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This study will deeply explore the political attitude of each participant to find whether
religion is the driving force behind their opinion democratization. After each respondent answers
each question, they were allowed sufficient time to elaborate on what factors shape their
particular viewpoint. They had ample opportunity to explain the level of importance of their
religious beliefs and personal values. Do the Muslim respondents cite their faith as a point of
conflict with the U.S. and its policies? If not, what other factors accounts for their viewpoint?
How does religion affect the perspectives of Coptic Christian respondents? Answers to the
questions will be compared in order to search for similarities and differences among respondents
of both faiths.
The hypothesis is that religion will not play a significant role when respondents’ are
asked to define of democracy. The lack of political and social freedoms in Egypt has created a
situation in which the majority of citizens have been conditioned to be uninterested in politics and
especially issues concerning democracy. Over time citizens have come to understand that it
serves no purpose to discuss the subject of democracy. It is considered an idealistic notion that
has no bearing on the struggles of daily life. In addition, issues pertaining to democratic theory or
practices are not included in the general school curriculum. Teaching democratic tenets in the
education system would reveal the undemocratic practices of the Egyptian government and cause
widespread discontent. This would defeat an important goal of federal education, to protect the
interests of the ruling regime. Even in social circles, discussing issues relating to politics and
democracy are seen as pointless. Therefore, whether Coptic Christian or Muslim, the respondents
will most likely have a limited scope of democracy.
Based on previous research and historical studies, the great majority of respondents will
not be affiliated with a political party. While general apathy will probably be the main driving
force, it is possible that religion will also have an effect on whether a respondent is involved in a
political party. Government restrictions on religious political parties like the Muslim
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Brotherhood, has created a situation in which all parties are secular and not based on religious
beliefs. Secular parties would not be representative of a deeply religious person who believes that
politics should be based on religious teachings.
Another hypothesis is that religion would not play a central role in how the respondents’
view U.S. democratization policy in the Middle East. Their perceptions of 2003 War in Iraq and
the Greater Middle East Initiative are expected to be based on ideas generally unrelated to their
religious beliefs. Rather, they will express opinions and feelings based on how they perceive
U.S. actions and intentions. Perceptions based on U.S. policies, makes it likely that Muslim and
Coptic Christian respondents will have similar perceptions. This is based on the idea that both
will likely draw on a common Egyptian or Middle Eastern identity when faced with issues
relating to the U.S., as a Western power, and new ideas of democratization. U.S. foreign policies
in the region especially in the Arab-Israeli conflict, 2003 War in Iraq, and 2002 invasion of
Afghanistan will likely have the most negative influence on their perceptions.
Religion will mostly likely be a factor for Muslim respondents when asked about
democratic reforms in their country. For those that are receptive to America’s push for
democracy in Egypt, they may also express a need to incorporate Islamic tenets in the reform
process. Given the secular and unrepresentative Egyptian government, Muslim respondents may
see democratization as an opportunity to create political institutions or processes that are more
representative of their religious beliefs. Coptic Christian respondents, as small minority of the
population, would object to a government based on Islamic tenets. They would prefer religious
equality and representation in the political system without a monopoly of only one religion.
The results of the interviews show that all but one respondent used simple and concise
descriptions with only a few characteristics to describe their definition of democracy. Neither
Muslim nor Coptic respondents expressed an in-depth analysis of democratic processes or ideas.
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This confirms the idea that regardless of faith, these respondents are not accustomed to discussing
the concept of democracy.
The majority of respondents (five Muslims and one Coptic Christian) had very similar
answers to all of the questions concerning the U.S. They all cited numerous past U.S. foreign
policies and described them as contradictory and hypocritical. The policies were repeatedly used
as reasons why they mistrust U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East today. The Coptic
respondent expressed the same negative sentiment citing similar examples as all other Muslim
respondents. He even articulates this idea saying, “This viewpoint has nothing to do with my
religion. I am a Christian and will have the same opinion as a Muslim. It doesn’t matter what
religion you are.” This undoubtedly shows that this respondent expects both Muslims and Coptic
Christians in Egypt to relate to a common identity and hold the same opinions of the U.S. and its
policies. This group of respondents falls in line with the hypothesis that Egyptians will share
similar opinions of the U.S. and democratization regardless of their religion.
The hypothesis was not entirely correct, however. There was one deviant Coptic
Christian respondent who will be referred to as “Mariam”. Her general worldview is heavily
guided by an anti-Islamic sentiment. Her words plainly expressed a great deal of animosity felt
towards Muslims. While her mannerisms were stern and serious throughout much of the
interview, she would get heavily agitated when discussing Islam. She explains that she has read
the Q’uran (the Islamic Holy Scripture) three times and dislikes its teachings saying, “This is a
religion? What a religion! God forgive them. They write about bad things, dirty ideas.” This
obvious abhorrence of the Islamic faith causes her to identify as a Christian rather than an Arab or
Egyptian, which sets the backdrop for the rest of the interview.
She frequently mentions issues pertaining to religion and religious discrimination
explaining that, “discrimination is terrible in Egypt. If a little Muslim boy sees me wearing a
cross around my neck, he’ll make a face or gesture at me” and “Muslims also burn churches and
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beat up priests.” Mariam’s claims of religious discrimination imply that there is a significant lack
of tolerance and pluralism in Egypt, which are necessary characteristics for a viable democracy.
When asked to define democracy, she briefly mentions freedom to write freely in the
press. She then immediately begins criticizing the lack of free speech in Egypt, “They [Egyptian
government] say that you can say what you want, but you really can’t.” She claims that the
government shut down her newspaper company to emphasize the lack of freedoms in Egypt. She
then tells another personal story of how she grieved when a journalist of the Al-Ahram newspaper
disappeared. She explained about that he “spoke about what people want” and how she “cried so
hard when he disappeared”. Her personal stories of discrimination have made her feel
disadvantaged in her country and it is clear that she is unhappy with the current status quo.
Discrimination is clearly a very personal and sensitive issue for her that has influenced her
perceptions regarding democratization.
Mariam’s answers to the many of the questions regarding the U.S. continue to diverge
considerably from the rest of the respondents. She is the only respondent with a positive opinion
towards the U.S. government and the Bush Administration. She expresses unwavering support of
the U.S. and its presence in the Middle East. This is partially based on her anti-Islam worldview
and unhappiness with the domestic situation in Egypt. She blames the current domestic situation
on Islam, “Egypt and the Middle East will always go backwards as long as Islam is dominant.”
When asked about why the U.S. has enacted a democratization policy in the Middle East, Mariam
explains it as rhetoric by the Bush Administration in order to achieve other goals. She does not
believe that the policy was put forth to promote democracy saying, “Bush pretends to care for
them [Arabs] so that he can control them and bring them closer.” Her view is similar to the rest
of the respondents who also believe that the U.S. is deceiving Arabs. However, the difference in
Mariam’s reaction stems from a difference in identity. For the others, the perception that the U.S.
is deceiving Arabs causes them to have negative opinions of the U.S. because they consider
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themselves Arabs as well. In Mariam’s case, she refers to Arabs as “them” as a group
disassociated from her own. Throughout the interview, her tone was overtly condescending when
describing Middle Easterners in relation to the U.S. It is clear that she identifies with the West, in
this case the U.S., rather than an Arab identity.
Mariam speaks of the U.S. in a tone that seems unapologetic and defensive. She supports
the U.S. saying plainly, “I love America” and citing various reasons for her positive view. She
feels that the U.S. respects animals, people and have contributed greatly to the world’s
technology. Even though she believes that the U.S. policy is not sincere, she still supports the
U.S. and its invasion of Iraq saying, “I respect Bush because he’s done nothing wrong. So the
military is there [Iraq]. What has he done wrong?” Her argument seems to blame the Iraqis by
explaining how the U.S. cannot possibly leave Iraq because of the violence and beheadings. She
sees the U.S. military as forced to stay in the country because of the violent situation.
Mariam’s perception is obviously one that is highly driven by her personal anti-Muslim
feelings with her own words unmistakably confirming that. Her support of U.S. policy in the
Middle East is linked to her perception that the Bush Administration is against Islam, and
consequently, in line with her own personal views. In relation to U.S. policy, she bluntly says, “If
it’s a war on Islam, then I agree!” The fact that she mentions the possibility that U.S. policy may
be a “war on Islam” is significant and relates to some of the other respondents who consider U.S.
policies as targeting Muslims.
Three Muslim respondents discussed religion throughout their interview. When
“Ahmed” was asked to give reasons for his negative attitude of the U.S. is based on, he says
claims that it’s based on U.S. policies and not because of religion:
Religion doesn’t guide my thinking. It doesn’t matter what religion someone is. I have
both Muslim and Christian friends. It doesn’t matter.

58

However, later during this interview, he refers to the Q’uran claiming that it contains scriptures
that predict a future U.S. invasion of Egypt. He then explains how all Egyptians would defend
themselves in response to a U.S. attack, “be sure that the 70 million [Egyptians] who are not able
to eat, will still hold weapons.” His tone at this time was quiet angry and outwardly aggressive
seemingly trying to show Egypt’s strong national identity and willingness of the people to defend
their homeland against outsiders. It was clear that this paranoia comes from deep-seated fear of
U.S. aggression and foreign control more generally. He expresses this fear clearly when saying:
We [Egyptians] leave Egypt because we are afraid of what will happen to Egypt. I have
two children, a boy and a girl. I am afraid of what will happen to them. Not from Egypt,
but from who will invade.
Ahmed is overtly worried about an invasion of his country and continues to give more reasons
why that scenario is possible. He claims that the U.S. already occupies Egypt financially and
politically giving it outdated technology to keep it from getting stronger. He also points to the
1967 June war as an example of how the U.S. and Israel will invade Egypt. His paranoid
sentiment is also extreme in other respects. He says that he also respects or admires both Saddam
Hussein and Osama Bin Laden who he sees as strong Arabs who had the courage to confront U.S.
domination. His views are more in-line with extremists and not common among mainstream
Egyptians.
In terms of religion, Ahmed’s perspective shows somewhat of a contradiction. While he
clearly states that religion is not an important factor to him personally, a brief reference is made
to his interpretation of the Q’uran as evidence of a future U.S. invasion of Egypt. He also cites a
number of past U.S. foreign policies to further establish his arguments. While he claims that
religion does not influence his perception, he makes other references that prove otherwise.
Religion plays a bigger role in his perspective than he would like to admit. Ahmad also says that
“American democracy is not for Arabs”, which is similar to the perspectives of next two
respondents.
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“Said” referred to Islam a few times when discussing a possible democracy in Egypt. He
expresses interest in America’s push for democracy in Egypt with what he calls “limits”, which
entail the incorporation of Islam, “Any changes must include religion. We are Muslim and
religious. It is the most important thing. We can fight years for religion.” It is clear that he
considers it essential to base future political changes in Egypt on religion. He opposes the idea of
a democracy in Egypt that is identical with that in the U.S. because of the nature of Egyptians
who consider religion “the most important thing in life.”
After making the case for the importance of Islam, Said then feels the need to justify his
religion. This is partially due to his earlier comments about how Muslims can fight years for
religion. He explains Islamic teachings by saying that “it says violence can be used only in selfdefense, in the homeland.” He also explains that Islam “can change over time” implying that
Islam is not static and has the ability to adapt. He continues by stating that it is not synonymous
with terrorism. He also feels as though the U.S. government does not make the distinction
between Muslims and terrorists. He then calmly asks why the U.S. targets Islam over other
Christian nations that have problems including wars and AIDS. Obviously, Said sees the need to
defend Islam against stereotypes and polices that both categorize and target Islam.
Another Muslim respondent also perceives the U.S. invasion of Iraq because it is
targeting Muslims. “Mohammed” says that in addition to other reasons,
The war in Iraq is a war on Islam. It is like the Crusades. Now that the Soviet enemy is
gone, the U.S. has made Islam the enemy.
He believes that U.S. government has considers Islam an enemy and the Iraqi war is a reflection
of that. His belief that Islam is being targeted by the U.S. is almost identical to Said’s.
Mohammed mentions Islam when discussing prospects for democratic reforms in Egypt.
Like Said, Mohammed also emphasizes the importance of Islam in Egypt, “the belief in God here
[Egypt] is very strong and cannot be ignored.” He expresses his frustration the incorporation of
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Islam in a reform process by saying that Egypt has no appropriate models to follow. He
expresses his frustration very calmly and logically when saying:
There are some who say Islam is the way to rule the country. But there is still no good
Islamic model to follow. Iran is a mess. Saudi Arabia is not even close. Turkey is not an
Islamic country. It’s totally secular. America is definitely not the model we will follow.
We don’t trust them or what they say.
He believes that Islam must be a part of any future reforms and does not know what direction
Egypt is to proceed with reforms. He is certain about one point however; that he does not trust
the U.S. and therefore, does not welcome an American-style democracy in Egypt.
Ahmed, Said, and Mohammed all consider U.S. democracy as not suitable for Egypt.
The central theme is that because religion is much more important for Egyptians, a completely
secular democracy would be incompatible with their Islamic values. They perceive U.S.
democracy with skepticism as foreign idea that is not reflective of their core beliefs.
Another demographic variable is political party affiliation. Membership in a political
party may cause the respondents to be more knowledgeable about the domestic political system
having been more exposed to it. Members of an opposition party would have more negative
views of the political system in Egypt due to the various obstacles created to restrict government
participation. They would be greater advocates for political reforms that will allow them more
access to the political process. Depending on their view of the U.S., they may also welcome
America’s push for democratic reforms in Egypt. Those affiliated with the dominant ruling party
have a greater chance of being satisfied with the current political system in Egypt. They are a
part of the single most powerful body in the country with almost absolute power for the decisionmaking. They would be weary of America’s call for democratic reforms for fear of losing power.
Five respondents showed little interest or complete distain for the Egyptian political party
system with two who were affiliated with a political party. The respondent who was a member of
the Wafd opposition party did, indeed, have negative views of the domestic situation in Egypt and
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welcomed the U.S. democratization policy in Egypt. This may be related to the lack of power of
the political party and the restrictions enforced by the ruling party. It is unclear to what extent
political party affiliation influenced this respondent’s opinion about American calls for
democracy.
The other respondent affiliated with a political party was a member of the ruling National
Democratic Party. The findings show that being a member of the ruling political party did affect
the way the respondent illustrated the political situation in Egypt. This respondent was unique in
that he described Egypt’s political situation as largely democratic and representative. He claimed
that 70 percent of Egyptians, or 40 million people, voted during the last National Assembly
elections. This is an extremely high participation rate and highly unlikely for Egypt that has been
cited for its apathetic political culture and corrupt election process. His exaggerated numbers are
used as an attempt to illustrate Egypt as a country that is already making significant democratic
reforms. He also showed a great deal of optimism when describing Egypt’s future. He predicts
that Egypt will continue to implement democratic reforms because of the younger members of the
National Assembly who have been recently elected.
His portrayal of the improving democratic situation in Egypt was a result of the fact that
he is a part of the ruling political party. His motivation is to present the political situation
positively in order to show that Egypt does not need outside assistance to enact democratic
reforms. Although he claims to welcome American calls for democracy, he claims that there are
limits to these reforms. This confirms the hypothesis that expected a member of the ruling party
to be more satisfied with the present domestic situation in Egypt than those who are not.
Another demographic category used for data analysis is whether the participants’ had
visited the U.S. prior to the interview. Theoretically, those who have previously visited the U.S.
may have a more positive opinion of the U.S. This may also translate into a more understanding
view U.S. policy than those who have not visited the U.S. Assuming that their experience was a
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positive one, it may allow them to have a better understanding of American ideas, people, and
culture that can contribute to feelings of greater sympathy. Nevertheless, there is always the
possibility that the exposure to the U.S. during a visit would have highlighted the cultural
differences and affect the respondent the opposite way making them more hostile to American
democratic values and ideals.
Of the seven respondents, only two had visited the U.S. many times prior to the
interview. Mariam expresses a very favorable view of the U.S. admiring U.S. inventions and
praising Americans because they “have respect for many things” and believe that “everything has
value.” Saad has similar positive views of the U.S. and explaining that he enjoys going to
America for vacation because “the country itself has a lot to offer.” Clearly, both respondents
attribute positive characteristics to America and take pleasure in visiting there often.
Despite their similar positive perceptions of America, the perceptions of these two
respondents differ sharply with regards to U.S. policy in the Middle East. Mariam supports the
U.S. democratization policy in both Iraq and Egypt while Saad explains how the U.S. government
is “immoral.” He says that he liked the U.S. in the past when he thought it “represented good
values.” He has since changed his view, he explains, because of U.S. policies, “Now when I
think of America, I think of selfishness, greed, control that is obvious through their policies.”
Although both of these respondents had visited the U.S. many times, their opinions of the
U.S. policies were very different. Their perceptions of the U.S. government and its policies in the
Middle East were not significantly shaped by their personal experiences visiting the U.S.
Therefore, each respondent based their political attitudes on factors independent from their
exposure to U.S. values and culture.
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General Patterns and Themes
The second method of data analysis will outline patterns and themes that emerge from the
data collected. Similar concepts, interpretations, and meanings that were expressed by two
respondents or more and are significant to the subject of political culture are outlined. The first
issue deals with each respondent’s definition of democracy.
The first question asks each respondent to describe their definition of democracy. The
respondents will be allowed the opportunity to provide their unique description of what the term
means to them. The manner in which each respondent defines and interprets democracy will set
the stage for the rest of the interview dealing with democratization issues and policies. The most
comprehensive response was given by the respondent who has a university degree in political
science and is part of the ruling political party. The others named only a few characteristics to
describe the concept. The most frequent characteristic of democracy was described as free
speech as the right to voice their opinions.
The emphasis on freedom of speech presents a general pattern among the six of the seven
interviews. Five of the respondents mentioned elections as part of democracy. This may seem
surprising that when given an opportunity to describe the concept of democracy in their own
words, more respondents would mention the right to speak openly than the right to choose their
leaders. There are a number of reasons that may account for this discrepancy.
One reason that freedom of speech was mentioned most frequently is because is one of
the partial freedoms granted in Egypt today. The increased ability to voice an opinion publicly is
a change that is obvious to the public and affects the daily life of citizens. Most of these
respondents are over the age of forty and remember much tighter restrictions on freedom of
speech during the Nasser regime. At that time, if they spoke openly about politics or criticized
the government they could be arrested or detained. This was a daily reminder of their oppressive
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regime. The fact that this is no longer the case today alleviates their daily fears making them feel
as though they have true freedom.
Magued specifically discusses the restrictive measures imposed by Nasser saying, “We
were scared to talk politics in our home…There was just fear.” He explains that Egyptians have
been granted the right to free speech by saying, “One day a person is cursing the president. The
other is cursing the government. I’ll show you the newspapers today.” He defines democracy
only in terms of freedom of speech to show that Egypt is in fact democratic. Since they have
been granted the freedom to discuss politics, there is already a democracy in Egypt which is not
in need of U.S. help to democratize. He specifically says, “We don’t need someone from outside
to help us change here. We are not like the days of Nasser anymore.” By defining democracy
only as freedom of speech, he was able to make the argument that Egypt was already democratic
and was not in need of U.S. assistance to politically reform.
Mariam also defined democracy only in terms of freedom of print to support her
argument as well. She made the opposite claim about the freedoms in Egypt with a completely
different view than Magued. Her definition of democracy was described with contempt, “That if
I write, they don’t break my pencil.” She explains her past experience with the government who
had stifled her freedom to write freely in an Egyptian newspaper. Her argument is that because of
the lack of freedom of speech in Egypt; the country is not democratic and therefore, in need of
political reforms. She is unhappy empty rhetoric of the Egyptian government that claims to allow
its citizens to speak and write freely without actually doing so. Her perspective is that without
freedom of speech, there is no democracy in Egypt making it badly in need of democratization.
Both Magued and Mariam described democracy only in terms of freedom of speech as a
means to describe their perception of the political situation in Egypt. Their approach was to use a
very simplistic definition in order to support their view. Magued described democracy as
freedom of speech to show that Egypt has already implemented democratic reforms while
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Mariam used the same simple definition to prove that Egypt is not democratic. Neither
respondent mentioned elections and are the only two that are part of the Coptic Christian minority
in Egypt. They know that as members of the small religious minority in a predominantly Muslim
country, they will most like be greatly disadvantaged in the event of an election. Minorities often
feel as though their interests will not be adequately represented in a democratic electoral system.
There is a significant discrepancy among Magued and Mariam concerning freedom of
speech and whether the Mubarak regime allows Egyptian citizens to express dissent with the
government. There is also a disagreement among other respondents concerning their political
rights and freedoms. Similar to Magued’s stance, Saad asserts that newspapers are allowed the
freedom to speak openly by saying plainly, “Mubarak allows freedom of speech in print.” While
Ahmed holds a completely different view regarding the right to speak openly in Egypt as he
warns the researcher about the possible dangers associated with discussing political issues
including arrest or detainment.
The obvious differences in how these respondents view their right to free speech are
troublesome for democratization. Perceptions are based on personal experiences with the
Egyptian government rather than on an undisputed legal document such as constitutional law.
The disagreement suggests that an individual’s rights are not widely understood among society,
which allows the government to selectively enforce restrictions on free speech as they deem fit.
The result is a partially free society where only views acceptable to the regime are openly
expressed. Views considered threatening or intolerable to the regime are repressed. For example,
the government allows constant anti-American, anti-Israeli, and anti-Semitic columns throughout
state-owned newspapers. Criticism directly toward the U.S. and Israel allows citizens to
continuously place the blame outward and distracts them from greater domestic ills.
Ahmed makes a significant comment that indicates the existence of government
nepotism. After he warns the interviewer about a possible arrest by the Egyptian authorities, he
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gives a scenario as to how this could happen. He claims that turning someone in to the
government would help someone who has personal aspirations to advance in the government
bureaucracy. The notion that there is possibility for a person to gain greater accessibility to the
Egyptian government gives an indication of nepotism and is a serious detriment to the concept of
the rule of law.
In terms of a democratic transition, the fact that more respondents mentioned free public
discourse than elections to describe democracy is not of great concern. Before elections can
successfully take place, citizens must be informed and exposed to various political opinions and
views. A political culture that encourages public discourse and political debate is more tolerant
and accepting of competing viewpoints. Citizens will find peaceful ways to disagree as they are
exposed to a wide array of ideas that accompany pluralism. A tolerant political culture must be
established first before elections can take place. Otherwise, an election can destabilize an entire
country by causing major conflict between people without a history of open and peaceful political
dialogue. To encourage a tolerant political culture, President Mubarak should open the stateowned press to other voices throughout the country and tone down its anti-American and antiSemitic rants.148 Citizens will eventually begin discussing the injustices within the domestic state
of Egypt rather than those outside their borders.
The next theme concerns the respondents’ affiliation with a political party. They were
asked if they are affiliated with a political party and to give reasons why or why not. They were
given an opportunity to explain the reasons why they were not politically active.
The five respondents who were not involved with in a political party gave almost
identical reasons as to why. Their lack of involvement stems from their perception of political
parties as ineffective or the corruption of the political system as a whole. They claim that the
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political party system was either inefficient or corrupt and saw no benefit in participating.
Ibrahim says that he does not like political parties because they do not have the power to change
anything:
Nothing will change if I join them. They don’t make a difference. They [Egyptian
government] will do what they want and nothing will change that.
Similarly, Saad explains that Egyptian political parties are “all corrupt and ineffective” and that
he does not vote because “the ballot boxes are already full.” He is implying that the elections in
Egypt are not free and fair and therefore, he has no motivation to participate in the election
process. Mohammed also mentions government corruption, “If you have lots of money, you can
buy your way into Parliamentary seats.” The Egyptian National Assembly is seen as a corrupt
body that facilitates bribery.
Another respondent makes a significant point regarding the high personal cost of voting
and the lack of benefits associated with it:
He also says that the government makes it too difficult to vote. You have to stand in line
for hours in the heat...and then the outcome may not be counted right. So it’s generally a
waste of time.
All of these respondents feel that political participation will not change the situation in Egypt and
are therefore apathetic to the entire process. Their statements support the hypothesis that
Egyptian political culture, even among the educated elite, is largely apathetic and uninterested in
political participation. The apathy is conditioned by years of corruption, lack of accountability
and obstacles to meaningful political participation.
An apathetic and disinterested individual lacks a sense of empowerment required for
political participation. The perception that they do not have the ability to change anything
because their vote will not count creates a situation in which the citizens do not expect much from
the government. The government is seen as corrupt with no accountability or transparency in the
political process. Without free and fair elections, voting is considered irrelevant and ineffective.
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Additionally, two participants alluded to the idea that the poor economic situation in
Egypt causes its citizens to be concerned with survival rather than political participation:
The Egyptian government makes the people worry about food and survival so that they
forget about the political process. They must eat before they can think about democracy.
The first respondent makes a very sobering claim about the Egyptian government. He claims that
the regime benefits from the poor economic state of its citizens who are too concerned with daily
survival to ask for more rights.
Sixty percent of the population in Egypt is still illiterate and worried about surviving.
They are too poor to think about the political process…The two main problems in Egypt
are education and economic level. When those improve maybe we can think about
democracy.
The fact that the majority of Egyptians are still concerned about meeting their basic survival
needs suggests that the standard of living is not at a high enough for an interest in political
participation. The high rate of illiteracy and lack of an adequate education create even more
obstacles for a viable democracy. When people are well-educated with opportunities to obtain
adequate employment they will no longer be concerned with survival. The emergence of a large
middle class in Egypt would cause a greater demand for additional rights including greater
political participation and meaningful elections.
The general acceptance of the status quo has a very negative effect on the prospects for
democracy in Egypt. It widely known that the Egyptian government does not abide by the rule of
law. The lack of faith in government leaders to abide by the law causes the regime to lose its
legitimacy in the eyes of its citizenry. There is a crisis of national leadership when citizens
cannot look to their government as the example of how to abide by the rule of law. If citizens
choose to emulate the actions of their government or follow its example, they too, will engage in
corruption and acts of bribery. Those who choose to follow the strict rule of law for fear of
consequences of the strong state will feel completely disassociated from their government. Lawabiding citizens, who see that those in the government are above the law, will be feel resentment
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and frustration. Anger about injustices combined with the feelings of powerlessness means that
citizens are more susceptible to the lure of extremist ideologies, which often advocate the
overthrow of the regime because it is seen as immoral.
The next open-ended question asked each respondent to describe their attitude towards
about the United States. The interviewer gave the respondents the opportunity to give examples
to support their view. Are their feelings based on values, the media, or U.S. policies? A pattern
found in all but one case is that perceptions of the U.S. government and its policies are
overwhelmingly negative. The general consensus is that the U.S. government and its intentions in
the region cannot be trusted especially because of hypocritical American policies.
Four respondents cite what they perceive as hypocritical or contradictory U.S. policies as
reasons for their mistrust. Mohammed says that the U.S. policies “say one thing and do another”
and that Americans leaders are “allies with dictators and topple their regime.” He argues that the
U.S. has “no shame” in changing its policies “even in front of the whole world.” Blatant
contradictions in U.S. policy are seen as arrogant and show a lack of integrity on the part of U.S.
government leaders.
Three respondents mention that the U.S. government has been friendly with dictators,
including Saddam Hussein, only to later enact policies against them. Saad’s comments serve as
an example this view:
They [U.S. government] say that they want to get rid of Saddam Hussein but they used to
be friends with him. He used to be their playboy.
Another respondent mentions how the U.S. supplied him with weapons and technology during the
Iran-Iraq war. Another mentions the concept of hypocrisy when discussing the subject of
terrorism. He claims that the U.S. labels everything as terrorism while it commits acts of
terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. He thinks that U.S. terrorism is “worse because it’s
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international terrorism.” Another respondent mentions several U.S. explanations for going to war
in Iraq by saying:
Bush said first that the reason he is invading Iraq is for weapons of mass destruction.
Now that they can’t find any, he claims it is for democracy.
The sense of mistrust felt by the respondents is a result of perceived hypocritical U.S. policies
used to prove that they should also not be trusted in the future.
One very important theme is the affect of the Arab-Israeli conflict on perceptions. Many
of the respondents perceive U.S. policies toward the conflict as biased towards Israel. U.S.
support for Israel is consistently repeated throughout many of the interviews as a reason not to
trust the U.S. This is seen as another aspect of U.S. injustice and hypocrisy.
Two respondents mention identical points when discussing hypocritical U.S. policies
regarding Israel and nuclear weapons. One explains how the U.S. prevents countries like Libya
from producing nuclear weapons and allows Israel to have them. The same reference to injustice
is expressed by another respondent who explains favorable treatment of Israel with regards to
nuclear weapons. He asks why the U.S. considers it acceptable for Israel to have nuclear weapon
capability and not for Libya and Iraq. Clearly, they perceive the difference in U.S. policy as
unjust with favoritism towards Israel compared to other Arab countries.
Yet another respondent explains America’s unequal treatment of its allies, Israel and
Egypt, saying, “U.S. gives the most military aid to Israel and the leftover, old-fashioned
technology to Egypt.” This perception is that the U.S. purposely makes Israel stronger in relation
to Egypt. The idea is that because it is an Arab country, Egypt cannot be a true ally of the U.S.
like Israel. Aid is not considered a U.S. effort to sincerely help Egypt, but to maintain the
strength of Israel in relation to it. The fact that they see U.S. aid as an arm of exploitation shows
the level of mistrust they feel towards the U.S. An act by the U.S. that may be considered a help
to Egypt, is seen as a means to control and subjugate Egypt to its will.
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Other respondents express their frustration about what they perceive as differential
treatment of Israel and injustice towards the Palestinians. One respondent explains this by
explaining a situation in which President George W. Bush endorses Palestinian rights disapproves
of Israel’s actions with Egypt’s President Mubarak. He claims that only two hours later, Bush
then gives the Israeli President approval to do “anything else they wanted with a guarantee that no
one will stand in their way.” This depiction aims to show the level of hypocrisy of the U.S.
government and particularly that of President Bush, as one that is outwardly hypocritical and
purposely deceptive. The U.S. support for Palestinian rights is seen as a blatant lie told by Bush
only to appease Mubarak, ultimately showing a lack of respect for the Egyptian President. This
also shows the respondent’s perception of Bush as lacking honesty and integrity.
One respondent says that democratization will not be possible as long as the Arab-Israeli
conflict continues because, “The U.S. has no credibility.” Another respondent says that America
does not represent democratic ideals because, “it’s all about supporting the Israelis.” Since the
U.S. supports Israel to be an unjust occupying force over the Palestinians, it cannot possibly a
credible promoter of democracy. If the U.S. stood for democracy, the argument goes; it would
sincerely support the rights of the Palestinians and curb the undemocratic occupation of Israel.
The lack of support for democracy for the Palestinians, therefore, is thought to be an anti-Arab,
pro-Western stance to exploit the Middle East. Consequently, the U.S. is seen as representing
values of a neo-colonialist power seeking global hegemony, which inherently contradicts the
promotion of democratic ideals.
The perception of injustices related to the Arab-Israeli conflict has a great deal of
influence on their opinions of the U.S. as well as their general worldview. One respondent says
that he does not have a problem with Jewish people, but with Israeli President Sharon,
“controlling land and people” through the occupation of the Palestinian territories and claims that
this is the “number one reason for terrorism.” Another describes another aspect of injustice
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relating to Western media coverage by saying, “One Israeli gets killed and it’s shown all over the
place [in the media]. One-hundred Palestinians get killed and no one shows anything.” He claims
that this injustice and unequal treatment creates hate.
Two respondents specifically make references to the suffering of Palestinians that they
have seen in the media. One says that “Palestinian women are shown crying on television
because their house is destroyed.” The other mentions violence shown in the media by saying,
“Sharon, Bush, I hate them. The boy that got shot in his father’s arms in Palestine, do you
remember that?” They are faced with what they perceive as injustice and feel as though they do
not have the ability to change the situation. Their government is seen as ineffective in stopping
the suffering of the Palestinians and has repeatedly failed to do so even after many wars with
Israel and extensive diplomatic peace efforts.
The anger and frustration that they feel regarding the tragic situation of the Palestinians is
fueled by media images that show their suffering. They see the conflict as a symbol of Western
domination and exploitation of Arabs. The failure of the Arab regimes to counter the neocolonialism renders them incapable of protecting Arabs against the many years of humiliation of
a historically great people. They cannot rely on their government to change this situation and
lack the ability to elect new government leaders. They are forced to accept the injustice they
repeatedly see on their televisions every night while feeling powerless to change anything.
A related theme throughout many interviews is the reference the relationship between the
U.S. and Jewish people. One respondent believes that, “Americans and Jews are full of
corruption.” The common perception is that the U.S. is so heavily influenced by the JewishAmerican community that they have the ability to control the media. They use the media to
influence both U.S. citizens and their politicians in power to be anti-Arab and anti-Islam. They
see America as hijacked by the Jewish community in order to brainwash the American citizenry
and create policies against the Arabs. There is a sense that the respondents see Israel is so
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powerful that it can manipulate to U.S. government to enact policies against the interests of the
Middle East.
All six respondents have made numerous references to the idea of the powerful Jewish
communities both in the U.S. and Israel, representing a normative theme of helplessness or
vulnerability perceiving Arabs as victims. The general consensus among these respondents is that
Jewish people around the world are so powerful that they have the ability to control the world to
target Arabs. This suggests that religion plays a more important role in influencing their
perceptions than they may like to admit. For example, the respondent who claims that religion
does not affect his attitude; he later says “Jewish people run the media in the U.S.” Another
respondent claims that, “We [Muslims] have no problem with Jews” and later contradicts this by
saying that the Jewish lobby in the U.S. is, “all about their interests.” They seem extremely
concerned about the power of Jewish people in the U.S. to negatively influence policies to target
the Middle East.
The opinions of six of the respondents toward President Bush are also decidedly negative.
Two of the respondents refer to him as an “international terrorist” while two others say that he is
the reason that they dislike the U.S. government even more than they already had. Another
respondent says that Bush “does not negotiate or discuss” increasing terrorism because “the U.S.
has taught the Arabs that the only way to get their attention is to use violence.” This respondent
claims that because that the U.S. only responds to violence and that President Bush does not
engage in diplomacy. The perception is that the U.S. will not take notice of Arab concerns unless
violence or terrorism is used to force Americans to take notice. This is a dangerous idea for the
U.S. as it attempts to fight global terrorism and prevent violence on American soil.
After each interview, four respondents expressed great concern about the possibility that
President Bush be re-elected the in the following U.S. election in November. They were
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genuinely worried about the prospect of him getting elected, which means that they consider his
reelection as having a direct negative bearing on their lives.
Six of the seven respondents express positive opinions of either America or its people.
They have disassociated their negative opinions of the U.S. government and its policies from their
perception of the American people and the country as a whole. For example, one respondent who
had referred to U.S. action in Afghanistan as “international terrorism” later says, “My attitude
towards the people [American citizens] is great. I love them and respect them.” Another
respondent says that U.S. policies are full of “selfishness, greed, and control” and later saying, “I
like to visit American and go there often to vacation. The country itself has a lot to offer.” While
criticizing the U.S. government during the interview, two respondents briefly mention after the
interview that they are awaiting a visa to immigrate to America.
One main reason they are able to separate their opinion the U.S. government from that of
the American people is due to their own experience with government. Since they feel that their
own government is not representative of their core values, they are largely disassociated with it.
This makes it easy for them to envision the American people’s beliefs as largely disassociated
with that of the U.S government.
There is yet another more obvious reason that accounts for their ability to separate their
feelings about the U.S. government from the American people; the belief American people are
ignorant because they are controlled by a biased media. Four of the respondents of the
respondents feel that Americans are not informed of the “truth” because the media is controlled
by the Jewish population in the U.S. One respondent clearly states this by saying:
What CNN shows Americans is not true. I don’t blame American people, they don’t
know the truth. The Jewish people run the media in the U.S.
Another respondent mentions almost an identical point, “They [American citizens] don’t know
the reality because the media in the U.S. is controlled by people who do not deliver the truth” and
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later explained the power of the Jewish lobby. Yet another respondent claims the U.S. is not
democratic, “It’s like apartheid because the Jews rule all.” By blaming Jewish-Americans for
controlling the minds of the American people through the media, they are able to disassociate
their negative opinions of the U.S. government from their positive view of the American people.
Another respondent says, “The American people cannot be blamed for the injustices their
government causes.” Overall they see the American people as uninformed and ignorant because
they are victims of Jewish domination.
One of the most obvious patterns found throughout all but one interview, is the belief that
the motivation for the U.S. invasion of Iraq was based on a quest for oil. The one respondent who
claims that the U.S. motivation was not for oil still expresses doubt about the sincerity of the
democratization policy, “Bush pretends to care for them [Arabs] so that he can control them and
bring them closer.” The other six respondents claim that the U.S. invaded Iraq to acquire its oil
or control the Middle East either militarily or economically. Some of the responses are
summarized below:
They [the US] invaded Iraq for oil and to help reconstruction companies. Dick Cheney
[U.S. Vice President] helped Halliburton, his old company.
He [President Bush] went to Iraq for oil and to put more military bases in the Middle East
in order to control it.
They [U.S. government] want control of Iraqi oil and more military bases throughout the
Middle East.
It is clear that all of the respondents perceive that the U.S. invasion of Iraq to be motivated by
reasons other than democracy promotion. Not one single respondent expressed the belief that the
U.S. policy in Iraq was to create a democratic state.
These same six respondents believe that the Bush Administration should not be trusted.
Every single respondent expresses skepticism about the Bush administration’s policy of
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democratization in the Middle East by explaining it at a facade used to hide other hidden goals.
The following statements show the level of mistrust directly felt toward President Bush:
Bush talks about democracy to justify what he is doing. Is it being done for our [Arabs]
good? No.
Bush said first that he reason he is invading Iraq is for weapons of mass destruction. Now
that they can’t find any, he claims it is for democracy.
He’s [Bush] a liar. He doesn’t want democracy.
He [Bush] says that but its only words… He put forth this policy because he thinks they
[citizens of the Middle East] are stupid. He tells them that they need it and pretends that
he is helping them. But really he’s trying to fool them, tricking them. He actually wants
to control the Middle East. He won’t be able to do that without talking about other goals.
There is an obvious consensus that The Greater Middle East Initiative is a policy that has been
enacted to achieve goals other than democratization. They do not trust President Bush or his
democratization policy in the Middle East.
All seven respondents describe the chaotic situation and lack of democracy in Iraq is used
to refute the U.S. intentions for democratization. The lack of freedoms in Iraq after the U.S.
invasion is considered proof that the intent was completely unrelated to democracy. They believe
that because of the increasingly violent situation in Iraq, the U.S. never intended to promote a
democracy at all:
Where is the democracy? Ayad Al Elaway who worked in the FBI, CIA in America, was
picked by the U.S. and says the same things as Saddam when he came to power, ‘We will
destroy anyone in our way!’
Another respondent points to the Abu Ghraib prison scandal as a reason for skepticism about
democracy. This refers to the worldwide broadcast of several American soldiers physically
abusing Iraqi prisoners and sexually humiliating them. This brought worldwide attention to
American treatment of Iraqis during the war:
If they [U.S.] wanted democracy, they [U.S. soldiers] wouldn’t have done that to the
prisoners [Abu Ghraib prison abuse].
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These respondents do not see any signs of democracy taking hold in the country and focus on
issues of Iraqi violence and occupation. All the respondents agree that that the U.S. invaded Iraq
and proclaimed it as a democratization policy in order to achieve economic and political aims for
its own benefit. The invasion of Iraq is seen as a part of the U.S. imperialist strategy to control
the region with Israel at the Arabs’ expense.
All seven respondents also felt that the U.S. war in Iraq would cause terrorism to
increase. Examples of the current Iraqi situation are used as evidence for the claims that there
will be less democracy and more terrorism in Iraq. One respondent gives explanations for
terrorism saying that it “stems from poverty and hopelessness” and that the U.S. is not
“encouraging prosperity” in Iraq, but rather is “actually making the situation worse.” Similarly,
another respondent says, “If there was democracy and the Iraqi people could say their opinions,
there wouldn’t be any terrorism.” They are clearly pessimistic about the American mission in
Iraq believing that a democracy will not be established. They provide reasons for terrorism as a
justification and claim that the U.S. is exacerbating the problem as an occupying force in Iraq.
Another pattern among three of the respondents interviewed questioned whether the
September 11th terrorist attacks were committed by Arabs with each citing specific examples to
support their argument. The first gave two reasons to support the idea that Jews were behind the
terrorist attacks in the U.S. The first was the idea that all the Jewish people that worked in the
World Trade Center did not attend work the day of the terrorist bombing attacks and, therefore,
must have known about what was to happen ahead of time, “The Jews were not killed in the Twin
Towers. They left the day before and took that day off work.” This statement shows that the
respondent’s negative perception of Jewish people because of the great lengths they will go in
order to reach a goal. The second reason given by this respondent was the only way that pictures
would have been taken of the World Trade Center is if those taking the pictures knew that the
attacks were going to take place. The following statement clearly illustrates this point:
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How did they take so many pictures of all the angles of the building [during the terrorist
attacks]? They were ready to take the pictures.
He believes that the pictures taken of the buildings prove that someone knew ahead of time about
the attacks. This respondent clearly articulates the fact that he believes that Jewish people played
a role in these attacks. He explains the possibility that the Muslim extremist, Osama Bin Laden,
may have actually carried out the attacks but did so only through the help of U.S. and the Jews by
saying, “maybe the Arabs, maybe Bin Laden, but who makes them do it? The CIA, the U.S., the
Jews.” This respondent seems to be trying to find any reason to place the blame on U.S.-Jewish
conspiracy. It should be noted that this respondent is Coptic Christian, not Muslim, and is
therefore not protecting Islam from blame.
Another respondent attempts to use history as evidence for his claims about Jewish
involvement in the September 11th terrorist attacks by claiming that in the past, Jews have often
killed for a political goal, “The Messianic Jews have done it many times.” He claims that Jews
were responsible for the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand before World War I for political
goals. Since this assassination was the event to trigger the start of the war, he is in effect,
blaming the Jews for the start of World War I. His explanation of the present U.S.-Jewish
conspiracy is described as follows,
They are willing to even destroy something they own in order to generate reaction against
their enemies to achieve a certain goal. September 11th allowed the U.S. to react against
the Arabs for their own benefit.
Since post-September 11th policies are perceived as targeting Arabs, the U.S.-Jewish conspiracy
must have motivated it. The ultimate goal of this U.S.-Jewish conspiracy is to justify future antiArab policies. This is based on a zero-sum theory; the Jewish-American gain is an Arab loss.
Therefore by enacting policies that hurt Arabs, the U.S. and Israel will ultimately benefit from
this loss.
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The third respondent to express skepticism about Arab involvement in the September 11th
terrorist attacks uses yet another idea as evidence. He claims that the operation is too
sophisticated to be conducted by Arabs, saying, “They do not have the expertise and the brains to
conduct such as sophisticated operation.” He claims that Arabs, “strap bombs and blow
themselves up” and that they do not have enough “technology to fly planes and navigate it this
way.” Based on this he concludes that the attacks must have been a conspiracy between the CIA
or FBI with “the Jews from Israel, of course.” This conspiracy was in order to give the U.S. a
reason “to change its foreign policy from supporting the Arab regimes like Saudi Arabia.” Like
the previous respondent, this respondent also believes that the ultimate goal of the U.S.-Jewish
conspiracy is to ally against the Arabs.
There are many reasons that may account for their skepticism. The first is the high level
of mistrust of the U.S. and Israel with the expectation that their goal is to target Arabs. These
respondents feel that the U.S. and Israel would stage a large-scale terrorist operation in order to
enact anti-Arab policies. They believe that the U.S.-Jewish conspiracy considers Arabs as their
enemy and aims to frame them so that they would have an excuse to make Arabs suffer.
The second is a notion of self-defense. They would rather place the blame on another group than
to admit that the terrorists were Arabs from their part of the world. By deflecting the blame, they
avoid addressing the idea that members from their own culture are violent extremists who are
capable of causing the deaths of so many innocent people. Denial of the problem allows for
complete avoidance of the situation. This perspective sees such large-scale terrorism as foreign
to their people and more closely associated with the Americans or Jewish.
The third is their self perception about their people. They see Arabs as incapable of
conducting a large-scale sophisticated operation that flies American airplanes into skyscrapers.
The respondent is clearly saying that his own people are too simple-minded and technologically
incompetent to be responsible for the attacks. The only agents capable of such an intricate and
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evil operation, as the argument goes, are the Americans and Israelis. This implies that Arabs are
incompetent while Americans and Jews are quiet capable.
Yet another respondent described President Bill Clinton’s affair with Monica Lewinsky
through the lens of a Jewish conspiracy to control of the U.S. He claimed that the reason behind
her public confession was politically related to Israel. Because she was Jewish, his argument
continued, she plotted against the President to prevent him from pressuring Israel. He uses the
material evidence for the extra-marital affair in order to support his argument, saying “Why
would she [Monica Lewinsky] hold on to that dress for three to four years?” This respondent is
convinced that the reason for her public statement was because she is Jewish. His general
viewpoint is that the Jewish community in the U.S. almost impeached President Clinton in order
to protect Israel. This is clearly evident when he states, “Clinton was almost ousted because Jews
didn’t want pressure [from the U.S. government] on Israel.” This respondent sees Clinton’s
personal scandal within the framework of Jewish domination. Jews are understood to be the
cause of every conflict for Israel’s benefit.
Another conspiracy was briefly mentioned by a fifth respondent concerning President
George H. Bush. This respondent claimed that the President received millions of dollars from
Kuwait for invading Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War. This view is related to the argument often used
to describe U.S. involvement in the second Gulf War; that the U.S. acts militarily for an economic
benefit. Based on this perception, U.S. policies cannot be trusted because their intentions are may
be based on hidden economic reasons. This respondent also shows underlying feelings of
mistrust that shape his perception about the U.S.
Another reason to account for the prevalence of conspiracy theories is the lack of
information reaching Egyptian citizens. Without substantial facts and valid explanations of
reality, people will often create theories to explain the world. Theories will stem from their
feelings and emotions without any real evidence for their claims. Hazem Saghiya is an Arab
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intellectual who accurately describes the cause for widespread conspiracy theories in Egypt. He
says that the Egyptian Ministry of Information and national press prevent competing ideas often
by taking drastic measures such as shutting down independent journals all together. He considers
this the main cause of conspiracy theories, “when the facts do not reach [the public], rumors,
exaggerations, fantasies, and fears develop” and that “the regression in the role [of people in
society] increases paranoia, rather than stimulating minds to think independently and freely.”149
Conspiracy theories are more likely to develop in an environment that does not promote a variety
of ideas and discourages all criticism of the status quo. A free flow of information is required to
encourage critical thinking and tolerance of competing views.

Comparison with Public Opinion Surveys
The general political attitudes of the educated Alexandrians are consistent with those of
the general mass population in Egypt. The views expressed by six of the seven respondents are
similar to the answers in Shibley Telhami’s 2003 survey. It showed that 13 percent of Egyptians
surveyed had a favorable opinion (2 percent very favorable and 8 percent somewhat favorable) of
the U.S. and 79 percent (58 percent very unfavorable and 20 percent somewhat unfavorable)
showing an unfavorable view.150 Similarly, the data collected from the interviews shows that
only one respondent showed a favorable view of the U.S. The other six expressed a negative view
of the U.S. government and its policies. Three of these six respondents, however, separated their
negative view of the U.S. government from their positive view of the American people. By
making this distinction, they would fall into the category of “somewhat unfavorable” views of the
U.S.
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The survey also showed that almost half (46 percent) of Egyptians said that they based
their attitude toward the U.S. on its policy in the Middle East. Overall the majority of
respondents cited U.S. policies as reasons for their negative attitude toward the U.S. government
including support for Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict, past hypocritical policies, and the
occupation of Iraq. The perception of American policies in the region played the central role in
each of these respondents’ negative perceptions. The survey also found that the remaining 43
percent of Egyptians based their negative attitude on their values. One respondent’s positive
view of the U.S. was certainly influenced by personal values related to Christianity. Three other
respondents while emphasizing flawed U.S. policies also say that a U.S.-style democracy is
incompatible with their core religious beliefs. It is not entirely clear which one of these
categories they would belong to.
A third obvious similarity lies in the issue concerning U.S. intentions in Iraq. The survey
showed that 77 percent of Egyptians surveyed felt that U.S. policy in Iraq was motivated by oil.151
Once again, this is comparable to the answers given by the educated Egyptians interviewed in the
qualitative study. The overwhelming majority of those interviewed (six of the seven) also
mentioned oil as a main reason behind the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The survey showed that 66
percent of surveyed Egyptians named Israel as an important reason for the American policy in
Iraq.152 During the many of the interviews, the issue of U.S. support of Israel was also frequently
mentioned as a motivation factor for U.S. actions in the region.
Yet a fourth similarity can be found in the perceptions about the prospects for democracy.
Telhami’s survey concludes that only 6 percent of the masses in Egypt felt that the war in Iraq
would bring more democracy and the majority (63 percent) saying that it would not.153 Every
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single Egyptian respondent interviewed expressed pessimism about democracy in Iraq as well as
the rest of the Middle East. All seven individuals share similar perceptions as the great majority
of those surveyed expecting less democracy as outcome of the Iraqi war.
The results of the qualitative study converge considerably with those found one year
earlier using a quantitative survey method. The great majority of these educated Alexandrians
have similar perceptions as the mass population in Cairo. Neither education level nor residence
in a historically liberal city caused them to have different interpretations of U.S. democratization
policy. This indicates that there is considerable agreement that U.S. policies cannot be taken at
face-value and are generally viewed with skepticism.

Summary of Findings
Over forty years ago, Leonard Binder described the political culture of the Egyptian
educated class as accepting the notion that they “cannot relate to the government, cannot change
anything, there is only one policy, and everyone must confirm to that policy”.154 The same
statement can still be applied today to describe the perspective of the seven participants in this
study. The great majority of respondents showed a great deal of apathy regarding political
participation in political parties or the election process. For the most part, they are disassociated
from their government leaders and entire political process as a whole. Political parties are seen as
ineffective and corrupt bodies made up of members that are self-interested. Elections are viewed
as futile because of widespread government corruption preventing a free and fair outcome.
There remains a large gap between the Egyptian regime and its citizens with very little
meaningful dialogue between the two. Egyptians are generally uninformed about the country’s
political decision-making as well as their individual rights. It is accepted that the government is
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unrepresentative personal interests and unresponsive to daily needs. Consequently, Egyptian
people have minimal expectations of governmental output and fail to exert pressure on their
leaders to provide more.
The Nasser’s tactic of distracting citizens with injustices beyond Egypt’s borders is also
still evident today in Mubarak’s Egypt. Using a more subtle approach, Mubarak maintains the
same strategy by allowing citizens to focus on the injustice of Western dominance, in effect,
deferring blame. The Egyptian national press (and Arab news channels) continuously emphasizes
the suffering of Palestinians because of the brutal Israeli occupation backed by the U.S. The
Arab-Israeli conflict has continued to be seen as the symbol for Western neo-colonialism and the
exploitation of Arabs and Muslims. Egyptians are inundated daily with images that show what
they see as repeated injustices against Palestinians and Iraqis. The constant reminder of the
humiliation of Arab peoples is compounded with a sense of powerlessness. Citizens are aware
that they do not have the power to change anything or solve injustices against Arabs and
especially the Palestinians. Nor can they rely on their government, which has repeatedly failed to
defend Arab interests against Israel and the U.S. The feelings of vulnerability and helplessness as
well as anger and resentment fuel a perception nearly obsessed with the victimization of Arabs by
an all-powerful U.S.-Israel alliance. These respondents illustrate the depth of this perception as it
becomes an all-encompassing worldview.
The worldview maintains that the U.S. and Israel dominate the world and exploit the
Arab world in particular. They see Arabs as constantly victimized in relation to the U.S.-Israel
alliance as self-interested, violent aggressors. This worldview is partially the reason some believe
that it is unlikely that Arabs were the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.
Lack of information in the repressed Egyptian society also contributes to the formulation of
alternative stories and explanations of reality.
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Six of the seven respondents (one Coptic Christian and five Muslims) cite various
examples to describe what they see as injustice. The consensus is that U.S. policies are
hypocritical and show unequal treatment of others with U.S. government leaders seen as
dishonest and unethical. One respondent plainly explains that America no longer stands for
democratic ideals and no longer be trusted. The idea is that if the U.S. is calling for democratic
ideals, the actions of their representatives would be reflective of those principles. This unequal
treatment is presented with the normative consideration that it is unjust.
The lack of trust in the U.S. is shown repetitively throughout six of the seven interviews.
Reasons behind these feelings of mistrust are examples of U.S. policies, especially those related
to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since Israel is considered an enemy, the close U.S.-Israeli
relationship is considered evidence that the U.S. is also an enemy. Since both their interests are
so closely aligned, the hatred for the Arabs must also be shared, and therefore, neither country
should be trusted by Middle Easterners. Any attempts by the U.S. to assist Arabs should be
cautiously viewed with suspicion. They see America’s first priority as protecting and maintaining
relations with Israel, even at the detriment of all Arab peoples in the Middle East. As an enemy
of Middle Easterners, U.S. policies toward the region will always aim to exploit Arabs for U.S.Israeli interests. It is this framework that effects all other interpretations and meanings of the
U.S. and its policies.
Viewed from this perspective, the second U.S. invasion of Iraq is also an attempt to serve
U.S. interests at the expense of those in the region. While the U.S. explains the reasons to go to
war as motivated by promoting democracy and liberating the Iraqi people, these respondents see
ulterior motives. All of the respondents viewed the war as motivated by a U.S. quest for Iraqi oil
or for control of the region. They viewed the U.S. as self-interested with no intentions of
promoting democracy to help the Iraqis. Democratization, outlined by The Greater Middle East
Initiative, is seen as a guise to meddle in the domestic affairs of Arab countries and to allow the
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U.S. to have more power over the Arab peoples and their resources. Therefore, democratization
is not expected to be successful in Iraq or throughout the region.
U.S. justification for the Greater Middle East Initiative will never be accepted by those
who doubt Arab involvement for the attacks on September 11th. By denying the existence of
Arab violence towards the U.S., skeptics are able to challenge the motivations of democratization.
They dispute the very foundations of the policy often making it unjustifiable. The Greater
Middle East Initiative is not seen as a policy to counter extremism in the Middle East, but one
that is motivated by other hidden reasons. Alternative interpretations to explain these motivations
stem from the lack of trust in the U.S. as a neo-colonial power and the constant fear of
exploitation and humiliation.
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION

Implications for Democracy
These findings have various implications for the democratization process in Egypt.
Using Sidney Verba’s framework of analysis, the four dimensions of political culture will be
examined. The first concerns the most basic issue of national identity. The distinct ancient
Egyptian history has led to a strong national consciousness of the people that consider themselves
distinctly Egyptian. Egyptian society is also the most ethnically and religiously homogeneous
societies in the Middle East. Therefore, there is a strong national identity in which Egyptians
consider themselves members of the nation-state. This is a positive sign for the prospects of
democracy giving the national leaders the ability to mobilize its citizens as one cohesive
citizenry.
The second dimension is an individual’s identification with fellow citizens. A few
respondents mention their concern that an election would allow Islamic groups to come to power.
One respondent mentions his concern that if elections were held in Egypt, Islamists would win
saying, “In Alexandria, they [Islamists] won all local elections in the past, before they were
outlawed. That’s what we’re afraid of.” This respondent is weary of reforms that would allow
Islamists to come to power causing what he perceives as even greater problems for Egypt. Others
claim that Egyptians are illiterate or too poor to participate in the political process. This shows a
lack of confidence in other citizens and a low level of interpersonal trust. There is little
confidence in their fellow Egyptian citizens which is a missing characteristic of a tolerant society
required for a successful transition to democracy.
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The third dimension relates to beliefs about governmental output. All of the respondents
have few expectations of the Egyptian government. Most also admit that their government is
corrupt and ineffective and accept the status quo without question. Although they express dismay
with the economic, educational, and societal ills of the country, they do not expect the
government to change and provide more for them. This is also detrimental for the prospects of
democracy because of the minimal view of what the government ought to do for them. They
seem rather parochial because they expect to be satisfied from other institutions such as the
family. The lack of desirability for governmental activity places no demands on the government
and has significant negative implications on the emergence of an effective political system.
The last dimension concerns beliefs about how the government makes decisions. The
respondents seem to know very little about how decisions are made. They are generally
disinterested in political parties and show no desire to learn. The majority of the respondents
does not see a need to be involved with a political party and are not active participants in the
government. They do not feel that they have a role in the political process. There is also a
disagreement about what freedoms are granted in Egypt. Two respondents claimed that they have
freedom of speech in Egypt while two others say the exact opposite. The lack of consensus about
their freedoms shows that the respondents are distant and disassociated from political system.

Future Research
Additional interviews with educated Egyptians would provide a larger sample and a
richer variety of perspectives. Interviews conducted on a greater scale with more participants
allows for additional data that is most useful in identifying patterns and themes. The greater
number of respondents, the greater the chance that the perceptions exist in the general population.
In addition, asking the same questions among the same educated elite in Alexandria, Egypt will
show if perceptions have changed over time and why regarding issues pertaining to
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democratization and the U.S. role in that process. However, qualitative interviewing is costly and
time consuming making it contingent on both time and resources available to the researcher.
Further qualitative research should continue to complement mass opinion surveys in the
Middle East. As shown in this study, the combination of both quantitative and qualitative
methods in the study of political culture has many benefits. Qualitative interviews using similar
questions as mass surveys will continue to provide a more complete in-depth analysis of political
culture and show the complexity of perspectives. It also has the added value of either confirming
data findings or pointing out divergent results, which can reflect error or bias in research
instruments.155
Another option involves an approach that analyzes other sub-groups within a society. In
Egypt, it would be significant to compare across various groups such as the rural and urban
peasants, the governmental elites, and the wealthy upper class. Examining the worldview of
Egyptians from all sectors of society will show whether and how socio-economic level influences
political attitudes. There may either be a general consensus or sharp disagreement about the
prospects for an Egyptian democracy. Huge discrepancies among perceptions indicate greater
obstacles to the democratization process in Egypt.
Future qualitative interviews in the region should also take a cross-national approach and
compare perceptions of individuals from two or more countries. Perceptions in Egypt, for
example, compared with those in Morocco and Kuwait would provide insights from a country in
each part of the greater Middle East; North Africa, the Middle East, and the Gulf. The wide
demographic range makes comparison even more valuable. Do all respondents have the same
opinions about U.S. democratization policy? Perhaps they all identify themselves as Arabs with
the same concerns. On the other hand, there may be a sharp difference of perceptions of
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democratization, for example, because of their unique national histories. This comparison would
be highly useful in identifying whether participants identify with a pan-Arab cultural
interpretation or a more nationalistic perception.
It is clear that additional qualitative research is conducted in the Middle East to further
explain its political culture and perceptions that are vital to understanding the Arab world. In an
increasingly integrated world with the risks of global terrorism, it is imperative to conduct area
studies in a region that is largely misunderstood by Westerners. Personal narratives provide a
deeper analysis of the Arab worldview and leads to a comprehensive understanding of their deep
fears and threats. This will help bridge the widening gap of perceptions between Middle
Easterners and the West, ultimately contributing to the quest for a safer and more secure world
order.
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APPENDIX A: Interview Questions

1.

How do you define democracy?

2.

Are you part of an Egyptian political party? Why or Why not?

3.

What is your attitude towards the United States?

4.

President Bush has proclaimed the ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ to democratize the
Middle East from Morocco to Pakistan. Why do you think this policy has been put forth?
Will it succeed? Why or why not?

5.

The Bush Administration is seeking to begin democratization in the Middle East with the
removal of Saddam Hussein. Will the U.S.-Iraq war mean more democracy or less
democracy in the Middle East? Why or Why not?

6.

The U.S. has been asking Egypt to ‘show the way’ for other Arab countries and lead
democratic reform. Do you welcome America’s call for democratic ideals in Egypt?
Why or Why not?”
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APPENDIX B: Interview One Data

Date of Interview: June 3, 2004
Place of Interview: Luxor, Egypt (on a Nile Cruise Ship)
Demographic information:
Career: Entrepreneur who owns many businesses including the development of a German
school in Alexandria.
Political Party: None.
Religion: Muslim.
Degree: Graduated with Bachelors in Faculty of Commerce from Alexandria University.
Residence: Alexandria, Egypt
Current Occupation: Manager of a Nile Cruise.
Age: 45
Visited the U.S.: No
Name: “Ahmed”
Q: How to you define “democracy”?
A: Free speech. To say my opinion as I want. Accurate information needs to reach an individual.
Today’s vision is not the same as 7,000 years ago [in Egypt]. We received zero votes for the
World Cup. When the judges came to the country [before the voting] to see what we had to offer
the world for the soccer match, we showed them the pyramids. What have we done presently? We
showed him accomplishments of the past. And then he got mugged in our streets. Of course we
didn’t get any votes. Elections, to pick another choice. Someone who loves the country and who
is capable. I travel a lot. And I see how people live. See how people live here. [as he points to the
homes made out of clay]. His mannerisms show disgust and frustration.
Q: What is your attitude towards the U.S.?
A: I don’t like it. I have had a visa for five years and have never been there. Jewish people run it
[U.S.] Many people say that the Jews were responsible for September 11th. To hurt the Arabs
[image]. 70 million Egyptians and me are being choked [by America]. If the U.S. wants to come
into Egypt with soldiers [invasion], I will be the first in the face against U.S. soldiers [points his
index finger straight ahead]. I hate Bush. I even like Putin more than Bush. Bush is bloody.
Becomes very aggressive and audibly louder.
Q: What is this attitude based on?
A: My feelings are based on their policies. Not because of religion. Religion doesn’t guide my
thinking. It doesn’t matter what religion someone is. I have both Muslim and Christian friends as
well as American friends. It doesn’t matter.
Q: How long have you had this view?
A: For a long time. At least for the last ten years.
Q: President Bush has proclaimed the ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ to democratize the
Middle East from Morocco to Palestine. Why do you think this policy has been put forth?
A: He’s a liar. He doesn’t want democracy. He wants to rule them in order to take their resources.
Control their media. Economically, politically control them. He wants resources, oil. Speaking
very confidently, in a matter-of-fact way.
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Q: Will democratization succeed? Why or why not?
A: No, of course it won’t. He will try, but the people will resist. They must want it [for
themselves].
Q: The Bush Administration is seeking to begin democratization in the Middle East with
the removal of Saddam Hussein. Why do you think this policy has been put forth?
A: Saddam is the only one I admire. He stood up to the U.S., the only one in the Arab world. He
is strong. Not Mubarak, not the Saudis [stand up to the US]. When I saw the way he looked [on
TV], I cried [when US captured Saddam]. I cried after he’s gone. The only way they [US] took
Baghdad is because they had a conspiracy with the guards, with money. It was too easy. What is
happening today? They [U.S.] are getting beat up by loyalists [loyalists to Saddam]. U.S. went to
Iraq for oil.
Q: Will the war in Iraq mean more or less terrorism in the Middle East? Why or Why not?
A: It [US invasion] will increase terrorism. Look at Saudi Arabia today, where Americans are
being killed by terrorism. America is telling them to get out [of Saudi Arabia]. I even respect
Bin Laden as well. The U.S. will not leave June 30. Going in the bathroom, isn’t like leaving.
[Egyptian saying]. If they wanted democracy, they [U.S. soldiers] won’t have done that to the
prisoners [Abu Ghraib]. It was not just a few soldiers it was politics. A general policy of the US.
That’s why Rumsfeld is not fired. What CNN shows Americans is not true. I don’t blame
American people, they don’t know the truth. The Jewish people run the media in the US. US
doesn’t really want democracy [seems very serious and intense].
Q: The U.S. has been asking Egypt to ‘show the way’ for other Arab countries and lead
democratic reform. Do you welcome America’s call for democratic ideals in Egypt? Why or
why not?
A: American democracy is not for Arabs. Even in the U.S., Arabs are not able to form groups
because they will be deported or given problems. I do not welcome the U.S. because I don’t trust
them. Not 1 [person] out of the 70 million [in Egypt] or President Mubarak can trust Bush. If
Mubarak goes to the US to talk to Bush its only to protect Egypt from the U.S., not because he
trusts them [the US]. The problem is not just Bush; it’s the US government in general. Bush says
he’s fighting terrorism, but he is the terrorist of the whole world, an international terrorist. We
[Egyptians] leave Egypt because we are afraid of what will happen to Egypt. I have two kids, a
boy and a girl. I am afraid of what will happen to them. Not from Egypt, but from who will
invade. We are already occupied financially and politically. They [the U.S.] make Israel stronger
and us [Egypt] weaker, so that they [the US and Israel] will invade, just like the 1967 Six Day
War. The U.S. will invade, just like the Koran says. The U.S. gives the most military aid to Israel
and the leftover, old-fashioned technology to Egypt. Be sure that the 70 million [Egyptians], who
are not able to eat, will hold weapons [during a military invasion]. Sharon, Bush, I hate them.
The boy that got shot in his father’s arms in Palestine, do you remember that?”
(Yes)
Do you think CNN showed that [in America]? [Implying that it was not shown.] The 30 milliare
debt everybody [in Egypt] shares. All Egyptians who have left Egypt and gone to the U.S., keep
their money there. They don’t give it back to Egypt because they are afraid of the external
control over them. The Egyptian government makes the people worry about food and survival so
that they forget about the political process. They must eat before they can think about democracy.
At the end of the interview, he warns the interviewer about the dangers of interviewing in Egypt.
He says that if someone wanted to have the interviewer arrested, they could easily do so by telling
the government about the interviews.
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APPENDIX C: Interview Two Data

Date of Interview: July, 27 2004
Place of Interview: The American Center in Alexandria, Egypt
Demographic information:
Career: Attorney.
Political Party: National Democratic Party.
Religion: Muslim.
Degree: Bachelors in Political Science from Alexandria University.
Residence: Alexandria, Egypt
Current Occupation: Journalist for an Egyptian newspaper.
Age: 30
Visited the U.S. No
Name: Said
Q: How to you define “democracy”?
A: When the government does not have control over its citizens. When citizens can say their
honest opinion. When I have the right for a good quality of life. There is equal opportunity and
where opportunities are available. Elections, with the right to vote for Congress and the
President. Today in Egypt, newspapers can write anything. The law which allowed for their
arrest is now gone. All people [in Egypt] can say what they want. Gara-im El Ri’ya, which is
freedom of speech. Montesquieu says that the issue is not the approach the government takes,
rather the most important issue is how a leader deals in matters. Accountability. That they
[government leaders] can’t do corrupt things, like change elections. Even if there are many
choices for people, there can still be corruption. It’s not the way you elect people, it’s the
outcome and transparency’ [of the election process].
Q: Are you a part of an Egyptian political party? Why or Why not?
A: Yes, I am. I am a member of the Hiyzb El Watany [Mubarak’s ruling political party]. I want
to help my country improve for the future. My opinion is that in the future, Egypt will have a big
role. There have been a lot of good changes. Last government Ministers [members of Egyptian
Parliament] elected is very good. The old one ones were not re-elected because citizens didn’t
want them. We elect them every five years. In a very persuasive manner.
Q: What is your attitude towards the US? What is this attitude based on? How long have
you had this view?
A: My attitude about the US is twofold. My attitude towards the people [Americans] is great. I
love them and respect them. They are good and have contributed many things. Medical,
technological [inventions], for the future. I have always had this opinion about them. They don’t
know the reality because the media in the U.S. is controlled by people who do not deliver the
truth. The U.S. government only cares about themselves. They lobby for power [in the US].
They lobby for oil. The Jewish lobby. They are all about their interests. They [U.S. elected
officials] need money for their campaigns and they are pressured by lobbyists. Clinton almost
ousted because Jews didn’t want pressure [from U.S. government] on Israel. ‘Why would she
[Monica Lewinsky] hold on to the dress [material evidence for extra-marital affair] for three to
four years? She is Jewish.” My attitude was not always so negative towards U.S. policies. They
were better with Clinton. Jimmy Carter, I loved him. The Koran says that he, who kills one, is
killing all humans and those who protect one, are protecting all people. Even if it is a Christian or
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Jew, no killing anyone. Islam says we believe in both of them. We [Muslims] have no problem
with Jews. Only problem is with controlling land and people, like Sharon [in Palestine]. They are
religious like us. Sadat [former Egyptian president] said this in the Knesset [Israeli Parliament].
Q: President Bush has proclaimed the ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ to democratize the
Middle East from Morocco to Pakistan. Why do you think this policy has been put forth?
Will democratization succeed? Why or why not?
A: Arab countries will not accept external pressures, they will refuse. Princes from Arab
countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman will not allow elections to overcome the
government. They want to make all the laws. They want to be royal, the whole family. Which
prince will allow their control to be taken from them? We have groups internally, tribes and they
do not get [understand] American ideas! They cannot accept only one law! Every country has its
own thinking. Egypt is closer to American thinking because it has a republic with a President.
Republics can agree, not like royal family. The citizens say no to the U.S., not the government.
Q: The Bush Administration is seeking to begin democratization in the Middle East with
the removal of Saddam Hussein. Why do you think this policy has been put forth? Will the
war in Iraq mean more or less democracy in the Middle East? Why or Why not?
A: Where is the democracy? Eaid Al Laway who worked in the FBI, CIA in America, was picked
by the US and says the same things as Saddam when he came to power, ‘We will destroy anyone
in our way!’ He [Bush] went to Iraq for oil. All over U.S., Europe, and Arab world people are
saying ‘No blood for oil’. Also, he [Bush] wants to monitor the whole world and Iraq is in the
middle of the world and they [U.S. government] can monitor Russia, Arabs, and even Iran.
Q: Will the US-Iraq war mean more or less terrorism in the Middle East?
A: More terrorism, its obvious, isn’t it? But in Iraq, that is not terrorism. They are freedom
fighters. Just like during the U.S. revolution against Great Britain. That was not terrorism, they
were fighting for there freedom. Everything against the US is labeled terrorism. When the US
went to Iraq and Afghanistan and killed all of those people, wasn’t that terrorism? That is worse
because it’s international terrorism. Where’s terrorism? Who defines a terrorist? Palestine is the
number one reason for terrorism.
Q: The U.S. has been asking Egypt to ‘show the way’ for other Arab countries and lead
democratic reform. Do you welcome America’s call for democratic ideals in Egypt? Why or
why not?
A: The Egyptian Parliament, Maglis Al Shaab, chooses one person as a candidate and the people
vote. The people vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’. He [candidate] must have 50% to be elected. Parliament is
also elected. They are representative.
Q: How many people vote?
A: 70% of those registered, about 40 million voted for Parliament seats. There are a lot of
representatives from many political parties. The Muslim Brothers won 19 districts under a
different name. They now form a group, a strong voice.
Q: Do you welcome America’s call for democratic ideals in Egypt?
A: This is in our interest, my interest. Like the Marshall Plan after WWII. It is necessary for
Egypt to be a leader for others. But there are limits. Any changes must include religion. We are
Muslim and religious. It is the most important thing. We can fight years for religion. Islam can
change over time. There are many Christian countries with wars, AIDS, and many problems.
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Why target Islam? Islam does not mean terrorism. It says violence can be used only in selfdefense, in the homeland. Respondent’s demeanor remains the same throughout the entire
interview – very optimistic and persuasive.
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APPENDIX D: Interview Three Data

Date of Interview: July 5, 2004
Place of Interview: Alexandria, Egypt
Demographic information:
Career: Accountant.
Political Party: None.
Religion: Coptic Orthodox Christian.
Degree: Bachelors of Accounting from Alexandria University.
Residence: Alexandria, Egypt
Current Occupation: Manager of a car business.
Age: 45
Visited the U.S.: No
Name: “Magued”
Q: How to you define “democracy”?
A: To be able to say what you want. Freedom. When Nasser was in power, we were scared just
like Saddam’s Iraq. We were scared to talk politics in our home. Our mom would tell us to shut
up in our own homes because they [Egyptian government] might hear us.
Q: Are you a part of an Egyptian political party? Why or Why not?
A: No, I don’t have any political ambitions. I come from a culture that has made me not care
about politics. It makes no difference to me. I know that we can’t change anything.
Q: What is your attitude towards the US? What is this attitude based on?
A: I don’t like the US at all. I’ve never been there. It’s because of their policies, of course, and
their values, their concepts. The government is always the same, no matter who is elected. They
are always with Israel. Each president may be a degree up or down, but generally they are all the
same. Their concepts [the US], the way they think, that they should take something over in order
to get something. Do whatever it takes to get what they want. Can you be sure who is
responsible for 9-11? The Jews were not killed in the Twin towers. They left the day before and
took that day off work. How did they take so many pictures of all the angles of the building?
They were ready to take the pictures. Maybe the Arabs, maybe Bin Laden, but who makes them
do it? The CIA, the U.S., the Jews. Speaking in a matter-of-fact way.
Q: President Bush has proclaimed the ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ to democratize the
Middle East from Morocco to Palestine. Why do you think this policy has been put forth?
Will democratization succeed? Why or why not?
A: He [Bush] doesn’t want democracy. He wants to put on a show that he is good. He is trying
to give justification for what he is doing. A plan to start with Iraq and extend throughout the
Middle East [sarcastically] and he wants to include Pakistan to prevent it from being only Arabs.
He is threatened by that. Has corrupted Iraq. They [U.S. soldiers] protected the oil and left the
museums to be robbed. An initiative? He can’t. You can see the result in Iraq. Soon he’ll invade
Syria. They [U.S.] inspect nuclear weapons in Iraq and Libya but its no problem for Israel to have
them. Why don’t they care about if Israel has them? Why is it okay for them to have them?
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Q: The Bush Administration is seeking to begin democratization in the Middle East with
the removal of Saddam Hussein. Why do you think this policy has been put forth? Will the
war in Iraq mean more or less democracy in the Middle East? Why or Why not?
A: First they [the US government] said the reason for invasion was for nukes and weapons. Then
it was because of a link between Saddam and Al-Qaeda. He [Saddam] is a terrorist. These reasons
are just not true. They were a justification for his [Bush] plan. There are no weapons or a
relationship between Saddam and Al-Qaeda. Who made him [Saddam] anyway? The U.S. did.
They gave him weapons and technology against Iran during the Iraq-Iran war. They [the US]
invaded Iraq for oil and to help reconstruction companies. Dick Cheney [U.S. Vice President]
helped Halliburton, his old company. Bush talks about democracy to justify what he is doing. Is
it being done for our good? No.
Q: Will the US-Iraq war mean more or less terrorism in the Middle East?
A: More terrorism. Why? Because some people have beliefs. Americans and Jews are full of
corruption. Palestinian women are shown crying on television because their house is destroyed.
Why would they [terrorists] strap a bomb and blow themselves up? What would make them do
that? He can’t go to work; he’s watched his mom, aunt, uncle die- his house devastated. They get
stopped to go to work. All that puts pressure on people. There’s no justice. Different treatment
creates hate. One Israeli gets killed and its shown all over the place [in the media]. One-hundred
Palestinians get killed and no one shows anything. Aren’t they civilians? They [Israeli
government] do not allow reporters in Palestinian villages after they massacre them. The Arabs
have learned that the only way American listens, is by force, by killing Americans. The U.S. tries
to distract the world about Bin Laden and terrorism. So that the world will not realize what they
are doing in Iraq. But the world will know in time. Maybe not right away but they will know. The
Bush Administration used 9-11 so that they could have a reason to go to Afghanistan and Iraq. 911 gave him [Pres. Bush] a reason to go to the Middle East.
Q: The US has been asking Egypt to ‘show the way’ for other Arab countries and lead
democratic reform. Do you welcome America’s call for democratic ideals in Egypt? Why or
why not?
A: We don’t need his [Bush] help. People here [in Egypt] can say what they want. One day a
person is cursing the President. The other is cursing the government. I’ll show you the
newspapers today. We don’t need someone from outside to help us change here. We are not like
the days of Nasser anymore. We were scared to death to talk politics in our home. If you dared
say something during that time, you may not come home that night. We would say [the
expression], “they took him behind the sun.” We would ask as kids, ‘who would here?’ No one
knew. There was just fear. We were scared. It’s not like that now. We can say what we want.
We have political parties.
After the interview, he expressed great concern about the possibility of a re-election of George W.
Bush, asking repeatedly about the probability of his being re-elected. This respondent seemed
genuinely worried about the prospect. He also mentioned that he is waiting for a visa to the U.S.
and hopes to immigrate soon.
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APPENDIX E: Interview Four Data

“Ibrahim”
Date of Interview:: August 3, 2004
Place of Interview:
Alexandria, Egypt
Demographic information:
Career: Owns an accounting firm.
Political party: None.
Religion: Muslim.
Degree: Bachelors of Accounting from Alexandria University.
Residence: Alexandria, Egypt
Current Occupation: Custom Clearance and Transportation officer.
Age: 50
Visited the U.S.: No
Q: How to you define “democracy”?
A: Freedom. To say my opinion without any control over it. Everyone is free to say their
opinions. U.S. is supposed to be democratic but its not. It’s like apartheid because the Jews rule
all. Democracy is when one feels that he’s being treated like a human being. Elections are a
must. Citizens should have an opinion to pick their leader. Here [Egypt] we don’t have that.
Q: Are you a part of an Egyptian political party? Why or Why not?
A: No, don’t like them. Nothing will change if I join them. They don’t make a difference. They
[Egyptian government] will do what they want and nothing will change that.
Q: What is your attitude towards the US? What is this attitude based on? How long have you had
this view?
A: America is a country where I have never been. From what I have heard, it is a good country.
Israel tells the U.S. government what to do. In the U.S. the Jews are many and politicians are
worried about elections and getting reelected. Hosni Mubarak has talked to Bush in meetings
where Bush said that he would give Palestinians rights as a country, remove settlements and stop
the wall they [Israeli government] is building. Two hours later, after Mubarak left, Bush met
Sharon. He said the exact opposite and actually gave him the green light to do anything else they
wanted with a guarantee that no one will stand in their way. Why? Because he [Bush] wants to
be reelected. I don’t like the US government and their policies. When Bush came, I began to hate
the policies. Clinton was better. Bush Sr. got paid one milliare from Kuwait for the 1991 Gulf
war. But, I like the country and have wanted to go there for a long time. He speaks in an
overconfident manner; like he is privy to this information and is teaching the interviewer.
Q: President Bush has proclaimed the ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ to democratize the Middle
East from Morocco to Pakistan. Why do you think this policy has been put forth? Will
democratization succeed? Why or why not?
A: He [Bush] says that but its only words. If he doesn’t have it in his own country, how can he
have it anywhere else? He put forth this policy because he thinks they [citizens of the Middle
East] are stupid. He tells them that they need it and pretends that he is helping them. But really
he’s trying to fool them, tricking them. He actually wants to control the Middle East. He won’t
be able to do that without talking about other goals.
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Q: The Bush Administration is seeking to begin democratization in the Middle East with the
removal of Saddam Hussein. Why do you think this policy has been put forth? Will the war in
Iraq mean more or less democracy in the Middle East? Why or Why not? Will the US-Iraq war
mean more or less terrorism in the Middle East?
A: Less democracy. He [Bush] ruined the whole country. He say he wants democracy but he’s
occupying it. He hasn’t brought democracy! Terrorism is greater because of the occupation.
Why? People can’t get their rights in their own government so they kill themselves. It’s not right
but it’s because there’s no democracy. If there was democracy and the Iraqi people could say
their opinions there wouldn’t be any terrorism. You can’t fight terrorism because they have no
country and no base. He [Bush] said there were weapons of mass destruction but there is none.
He went to Iraq for oil and to put more military bases in the Middle East in order to control it.
Q: The US has been asking Egypt to ‘show the way’ for other Arab countries and lead
democratic reform. Do you welcome America’s call for democratic ideals in Egypt? Why or why
not?
A: It [Egypt] is the biggest Arab country with the largest population. America always talks to
Mubarak so that he will influence other Arabs. Ever since the October 6th war when Egypt won,
whenever America wants something from other Arab countries they ask Egypt to listen. They
give Egypt money and then they have control over our country, our education and even our
curriculum. Put this here, put that there. I do not welcome the democratic influence from the U.S.
They do not have democracy in the U.S. They [U.S. government] should worry about democracy
in their own country before they worry about democracy in other countries. I heard that you can’t
even say what you want there anymore. The FBI will show up at your house. They are not
democratic. I would welcome democracy but the US doesn’t bring democracy.

After the interview, the respondent keeps referring to his worries about getting his visa to the U.S.
because of the interview. He is concerned that I will be able to say something to prevent him from
getting a visa. I keep reassuring him that I am not a part of the US government and that we have
freedom of speech in America. He does not seem to be convinced that the U.S. is democratic.
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APPENIDIX F: Interview Five Data

“Mariam”
Date of Interview:
August 10, 2004
Place of Interview:
Alexandria, Egypt
Demographic information:
Career: Journalist and business owner.
Political Party: The Wafd Party.
Religion: Coptic Orthodox Christian.
Degree: Bachelors in Business from Alexandria University.
Residence: Alexandria, Egypt
Current Occupation: Attorney.
Age: 47
Visited the U.S. Yes
Q: How to you define “democracy”?
A: That if I write, they don’t break my pencil. I can say what I want. They say that you can write
what you want, but you really can’t. What about Rida Halal? He used to write in newspapers, a
journalist in Al-Ahram newspaper. Beautiful works. Where did he go? He disappeared. I cried
so hard when he disappeared. He spoke of what the people want.
Q: Are you a part of an Egyptian political party? Why or Why not?
A: Yes, I am a member of the Wafd Party and so was my father. During the Sadat era, I was also
one of six people to invest in a group that fosters religious dialogue between Christians and
Muslims. This was also to help prevent Muslim discrimination against Christians. Discrimination
is terrible in Egypt. If a little Muslim boy sees me wearing a cross around my neck, he’ll make a
face or gesture at me. Muslims also burn churches and beat up priests.
Q: What is your attitude towards the US? What is this attitude based on? How long have you had
this view?
A: I love America. I have traveled everywhere. Why? Not because they are powerful, but because
they have respect for many things. They respect people, animals and everything has a value. Also,
the U.S. has contributed greatly to the world’s technology. They [Americans] have invented many
valuable things for the world today. For as long as I have lived I have had that view.
Q: President Bush has proclaimed the ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ to democratize the Middle
East from Morocco to Pakistan. Why do you think this policy has been put forth? Will
democratization succeed? Why or why not?
A: “Bush pretends to care for them [Arabs] so that he can control them and bring them closer.
People say it’s a war on Islam. If it is then I agree!” I have read the Koran three times. The first
time I skimmed through it, the second time I read it and the third time I really knew it. “This is a
religion? What a religion! God forgive them. They write about bad things, dirty ideas. Egypt and
the Middle East will always go backwards as long as Islam is dominant. Democracy cannot
succeed when Islam is dominant. The whole Middle East is electrified and tense. Speaking
dramatically and seriously with disgust.
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Q: The Bush Administration is seeking to begin democratization in the Middle East with the
removal of Saddam Hussein. Why do you think this policy has been put forth? Will the war in
Iraq mean more or less democracy in the Middle East? Why or Why not?
A: I don’t believe that the US went for oil and to control the world, like many people say. If the
people in Iraq believed that the US was there for democracy, then it would happen. But they
don’t. There won’t be democracy in Iraq. There will be more conflict and war. The Shites want
power and will continue to struggle with many groups for power. They will keep killing each
other, just like in Lebanon, until they are fed up with all the killings. Each group wants control.
Q: Will the US-Iraq war mean more or less terrorism in the Middle East?
A: I respect Bush because he’s done nothing wrong. So the military is there. What has he done
wrong? He can’t leave. They are killing and beheading people right now, even with him there.
Q: The US has been asking Egypt to ‘show the way’ for other Arab countries and lead
democratic reform. Do you welcome America’s call for democratic ideals in Egypt? Why or why
not?
A: They [US government] actually commanded them to do it. I welcome them greatly. I wish US
would come back into Egypt like they were in the past. Egypt will go forward instead of
backward. Egypt today is actually going backwards. This is because of the strong Muslim
fundamentalism that is taking over the country. Omar Quadaffi [President of Libya] says he
wants to learn from the US and that’s why he’s been cooperative lately. He actually sent the
highest people to America to learn progressive ideas and gives them millions of dollars to
reconstruct Libya. Egypt needs to also learn from the U.S. instead of trying to resist it.
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APPENDIX G: Interview Six Data

“Mohammed”
Date of Interview: June 22, 2004
Place of Interview: Alexandria, Egypt
Demographic information:
Career: Civil Engineer.
Political Party: None.
Religion: Muslim.
Degree: Bachelors of Engineering from Alexandria University.
Residence: Alexandria, Egypt
Current Occupation: Owns Construction and Engineering business.
Age: 55
Visited the U.S.: No
Q: How to you define “democracy”?
A: When the decisions of the masses rule. When a state allows for collective decision-making.
People must be able to have the ability to choose. Also, the freedom to express frustration,
discontent or disapproval with the ruling government.
Q: Are you a part of an Egyptian political party? Why or Why not?
A: No, they are all vain. If you have a lot of money you can buy your way into the parliamentary
seats. I don’t vote for the seats because they make it too difficult to vote. You have to stand in
line for hours in the heat. The personal cost is too high. And then the outcome may not even be
counted right. So it’s generally a waste time.
Q: What is your attitude towards the US? What is this attitude based on? How long have you had
this view?
A: The policies of the U.S. are hypocritical. They say one thing and do another. They have no
shame in changing their minds to suit their interests, even in front of the entire world. They are
allies with dictators and then they topple their regime. America used to be a leader but now it is
an international terrorist. The people of America do not know except what the government and
special interests want them to know. The American people cannot be blamed for the injustices
their government causes. I have never been there and don’t really have a desire to go.
Q: President Bush has proclaimed the ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ to democratize the Middle
East from Morocco to Pakistan. Why do you think this policy has been put forth? Will
democratization succeed? Why or why not?
A: They use the ‘war on terror’ as a reason for democracy in the Middle East. But they [U.S.
government] were the ones responsible for September 11th with the Jews. Look at history. The
Jews have often killed for a political goal. The Messianic Jews have done it many times. Look at
when they had King Ferdinand killed before World War II. And that’s when Hitler punished
them. They are willing to even destroy something they own to generate a reaction against their
enemies to achieve a certain goal. September 11th allowed the U.S. to react against the Arabs for
their own benefit. They have control of Iraqi oil and more military bases throughout the Middle
East. No, it [democratization] won’t be possible. Not as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict
continues. The U.S. has no credibility.
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Q: The Bush Administration is seeking to begin democratization in the Middle East with the
removal of Saddam Hussein. Why do you think this policy has been put forth?
A: Bush said first that he reason he is invading Iraq is for weapons of mass destruction. Now that
they can’t find any, he claims it is for democracy. It doesn’t look good for the U.S. when they
change their reasons for going to war. The entire international community knows that the reasons
initially given by the Bush administration are false and that there are other reasons. Other than oil,
of course, the war in Iraq is a war on Islam. It is like the Crusades. Now that the Soviet enemy is
gone, the U.S. has made Islam the enemy.
Q: Will the US-Iraq war mean more or less terrorism in the Middle East?
A: Terrorism will definitely increase. Saddam Hussein kept the Sunni, Shite, and Kurds under
control. The country needs someone to prevent conflict between these groups. The Shites are
known for being extremely aggressive and violent people. And they are aligning with terrorists
from other countries now. Terrorism for the entire Middle East will increase because Iraq is and
will be so chaotic, it will provide a place for terrorists to operate.
Q: Will the war in Iraq mean more or less democracy in the Middle East? Why or Why not?
A: If the U.S. leaves Iraq there will not be democracy. There will be a great deal of conflict
between groups. The U.S. does not have the capability to democratize the entire Middle East.
The war in Iraq is a mess and will cause more violence and terrorism because no one can control
all of those groups. The belief in God here is very strong and cannot be ignored. The Islamic
parties are the most organized of all the parties. They would definitely win elections in the
Middle East if they were allowed to participate. Then they would be against the U.S. The U.S
would never want that, so they can’t really be serious about democracy.
Q: The US has been asking Egypt to ‘show the way’ for other Arab countries and lead
democratic reform. Do you welcome America’s call for democratic ideals in Egypt? Why or why
not?
A: No, I don’t welcome America’s push for democracy in Egypt. If we want democracy, it will
come from within the country not from outside. Here [Egypt] the military gets everything. All the
big homes and money. We used to believe that America was about democratic ideals and that was
something to emulate. Now we know that that’s not true. Its [U.S. government] all about
supporting the Israelis. There is no good democratic model to follow. There are some who say
that Islam is the way to rule the country. But still there is no good Islamic model to follow. Iran is
a mess. Saudi Arabia is not even close. Turkey is not an Islamic country. It’s totally secular.
America is definitely not the model that we will follow. We don’t trust them or what they say.
During the entire interview his mannerisms were very serious with a stern look on his face.
Expressed concerns after the interview about the possibility of Bush being reelected. He asked
about the chance of that occurring and seemed extremely worried about the outcome.
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APPENDIX H: Interview Seven Data
“Saad”
Date of Interview: June 27, 2004
Place of Interview: Alexandria, Egypt
Demographic information:
Career: Physician of Gynecology.
Political Party: None
Religion: Muslim
Degree: Medical degree from the University of Alexandria.
Residence: Alexandria, Egypt
Current Occupation: Owner of a private Outpatient Center/Specialist Hospital.
Age: 54
Visited the U.S. Yes
Q: How to you define “democracy”?
A: The ability for citizens to choose their leader. When people have the opportunities for a good
quality of life. Jobs that will allow people to improve their lives.
Q: Are you a part of an Egyptian political party? Why or Why not?
A: No. They are all corrupt and ineffective. Their votes don’t even count. “I don’t even get
involved in voting for seats in the Parliament because I know my vote won’t count. The ballot
boxes are already full before people vote. The decision is already made before the election takes
place. The voting process itself is corrupt.” Before 1952, people in Egypt were very politically
active and involved. Something happened in the Nasser era and people stopped being politically
active. It was probably the American influence on Egypt. The Wafd party is still around and has
newspapers with free speech. Mubarak allows freedom of speech in print. He monitors the
Muslim Brothers and all religious groups.
Q: What is your attitude towards the US? What is this attitude based on? How long have you had
this view?
A: America’s influence on Egypt has been negative. They give us aid but it helps our government
and military control the country. Their policies are self-interested and do not help anyone. I used
to like America when I thought it represented good values. Now when I think of America, I think
of selfishness, greed and control that are obvious through their policies. I am referring to their
policies. I like to visit America and go there often to vacation. The country itself has a lot to offer.
But the government is immoral.
Q: President Bush has proclaimed the ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ to democratize the Middle
East from Morocco to Pakistan. Why do you think this policy has been put forth? Will
democratization succeed? Why or why not?
A: The democracy excuse it used to meddle in Arab countries’ affairs after September 11th. First
you must ask who is responsible for 9-11? Do you really think the Arabs did it? No. They do not
have the expertise and the brains to conduct such a sophisticated operation. The Arabs strap
bombs and blow themselves up. They do not have the technology to fly planes and navigate it this
way.
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Q: Who does?
A: Probably the CIA or FBI with the Jews from Israel, of course. The US wants to be able to have
an excuse to change its foreign policy from supporting the Arab regimes like Saudi Arabia. The
Madrid bombing, yes, that was the Arabs who were responsible. But 9-11, no. It will not
succeed. Bush will not be able to. Let’s say, for a moment, that I agree for the U.S. to get rid of
Saddam Hussein. Now, if they [U.S.] invade Syria next, for example, the Arab communities [in
Syria] will welcome them to get rid of the Assad government and once they do, they will turn on
the Americans and fight them. The U.S. has taught the Arabs that the only way to get their
attention is to use violence. The Arabs think that the only way to get the US to listen to them is to
kill them. Bush does not negotiate or discuss. Just like in Beirut and Saudi Arabia and today in
Iraq. When Americans are killed, they are forced to action.
Q: The Bush Administration is seeking to begin democratization in the Middle East with the
removal of Saddam Hussein. Why do you think this policy has been put forth?
A: The reason was purely economic, for oil. They [U.S. government] say that they want to get rid
of Saddam Hussein but they used to be friends with him. He used to be their playboy. It will not
mean democracy in Iraq. There are no signs of democracy. Saddam Hussein used to kill the
Shites, now the U.S. kills the Shites. So nothing has changed. The Shites are so violent that the
only way to control them is through violence and killing.
Q: Will the US-Iraq war mean more or less terrorism in the Middle East? Why or Why not?
A: Terrorism is and will continue to increase. It stems from poverty and hopelessness. People
look to religion for a safe haven. When there is prosperity, terrorism will not be used as a viable
method. The U.S. is not encouraging prosperity, its actually making the situation worse.
Q: The US has been asking Egypt to ‘show the way’ for other Arab countries and lead
democratic reform. Do you welcome America’s call for democratic ideals in Egypt? Why or why
not?
A: We are not ready for democracy. And no, I don’t welcome America’s call for democracy.
America does not even have a true democracy. Neither does Great Britain. They manipulate the
people to think a certain way. Sixty percent of the population in Egypt is still illiterate and
worried about surviving. They are too poor to think about the political process. Even if you sit
with the youth in Egypt today, they have no interest in politics because they can’t say anything.
And even if we were to have elections today, the Islamic party would rule. In Alexandria, they
one all local elections in the past before they were outlawed. That’s what we are afraid of. The
two main problems in Egypt are education and economic level. When those improve maybe we
can think about democracy. This is not Egypt. You must walk through the city streets to see the
real Egypt. Also if you look at history, Egyptians are always looking for one person to lead them,
since the time of the Pharaohs. Mannerisms during the interview consisted of speaking calmly in
an articulate and intellectual way.
After the interview, asked about the possibility of George Bush being reelected. He expressed
hope that he would not be reelected.
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